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I. INTRODUCTION
The current rage in dispositional tax planning for closely-held C
corporations is to bifurcate the sale transaction into two components
comprising: (a) a sale by (i) the target C corporation’s shareholders of
their target C corporation stock or (ii) the target C corporation of its
assets; and (b) a sale by some or all of the target C corporation’s share-
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holders of “personal goodwill” associated with the business conducted
by the target C corporation.  The documented purchase price paid for
the first component of the transaction (either the stock of the C corpo-
ration or the assets of the C corporation) is based on a fair market
value determination that excludes consideration of the personal good-
will component of the transaction.  If successful, this tax planning
technique allows the selling shareholders to report only shareholder-
level capital gain on the personal goodwill component of the transac-
tion and allows the buyer to claim that this portion of the purchase
price is allocable to an acquired intangible, i.e., goodwill, that is amor-
tizable over fifteen years under § 197.1  More specifically, from the
selling shareholders’ perspective, if the first component of the transac-
tion involves a sale of the target C corporation’s assets, the portion of
the purchase price attributable to the personal goodwill component of
the transaction does not bear the burden of a corporate level of taxa-
tion.  From the buyer’s perspective, if the first component of the trans-
action involves a purchase of the target C corporation’s stock, the
portion of the purchase price attributable to the personal goodwill
component of the transaction is not capitalized into the stock.2
This planning is premised on the position that certain goodwill as-
sociated with the target C corporation’s business can be, and is in fact,
owned for tax purposes, by one or more shareholders.  If all goodwill
associated with the target C corporation’s business activities were in
fact owned for tax purposes by the target C corporation, then the per-
sonal goodwill component of the transaction is properly viewed as a
sale by the target C corporation of such goodwill creating a corporate-
level gain, followed by a distribution from the target C corporation to
the shareholders, which in turn creates a shareholder-level gain.3  If,
1. I.R.C. § 197 (2006).
2. A premise for this planning (in addition to the premise that is the subject of this
Article) is that the target C corporation’s business has a fair market value that
exceeds the fair market value of the assets shown on the target C corporation’s
balance sheet.  Thus, some value is attributable to self-created goodwill (i.e.,
goodwill that has not been acquired and thus is not reflected on the balance
sheet). See the discussion infra Part III.  As a result, if the first component of the
transaction is a sale by the target C corporation of its assets, the buyer generally
would treat a portion of the purchase price as allocable to goodwill and thus to
the purchase of an intangible asset amortizable under § 197 regardless of the
presence of any personal goodwill.  Accordingly, if the first component of the
transaction is a sale by the target C corporation of its assets, the principal pur-
ported benefit from the personal goodwill planning technique would be the avoid-
ance of corporate-level taxation.  If the first component of the transaction was a
sale of the target C corporation’s stock, the purported benefits from the personal
goodwill planning technique would include both the avoidance of corporate-level
taxation and the acquisition by the buyer of an asset amortizable under § 197.
3. Howard v. United States, No. CV–08–365–RMP, 2010 WL 3061626 (E.D. Wash.
Jul. 30, 2010), aff’d 448 F. App’x 752 (9th Cir. 2011).  The transaction might also
be viewed as a distribution by the target C corporation of the goodwill to the
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however, the personal goodwill can be, and in fact is, owned by the
selling shareholders and can be, and in fact is, sold by the selling
shareholders to the buyer for tax purposes, then its disposition is not
subject to corporate-level taxation.
Although this planning has garnered much attention recently and
could provide significant tax benefits if effective, we believe it deserves
further scrutiny before being accepted as an appropriate component of
dispositional tax planning for closely-held businesses.  This planning
technique also highlights the continuing horizontal equity problems
associated with the current tax law’s treatment of closely-held busi-
nesses.  In Part II of this article, we discuss the place that this tax
planning technique occupies within a historical context.  In Part III,
we set forth a substantive discussion of the issues raised by the tech-
nique.  In Part IV, we discuss the tax policy implications that are
raised by the existing application of the corporate income tax regime.
Finally, in Part V, we discuss some final thoughts about the implica-
tions of the analysis contained in this paper.
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
A. Pre-1986 Law
The ability to distribute appreciated goodwill out of corporate solu-
tion without bearing corporate-level taxation on associated built-in
gain was achievable under law existing prior to 1986.  In General Util-
ities & Operating Co. v. Helvering,4 the Supreme Court held that a
distribution of assets by a corporation to its shareholders did not con-
stitute a sale or exchange of the distributed assets and accordingly the
distributing corporation did not incur a taxable gain or loss from the
distribution.5  The General Utilities doctrine, as it came to be known,
was codified in the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 in old § 311(a)(2) as
to nonliquidating distributions and in old § 336 with respect to liqui-
dating distributions.
While the General Utilities doctrine protected corporations from in-
curring tax upon a distribution of assets, the shareholders would rec-
ognize shareholder-level gain on the distribution equal to the excess of
the fair market value of the distributed assets over the shareholder’s
stock basis.  When the shareholder later sold the distributed assets to
shareholder followed by a sale of such goodwill by the shareholder to the buyer.
The result, however, would be the same.
4. Gen. Utils. & Operating Co. v. Helvering, 296 U.S. 200 (1935), superseded by stat-
ute, Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 631(a), 100 Stat. 2085, 2269.
5. See 1 BORIS I. BITTKER & JAMES EUSTICE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF CORPORA-
TIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS ¶8.20 (7th ed. 2006 & Supp. 2011); see also H.R. REP.
NO. 99-841, pt. 2, at 98 (1986) (reporting that the General Utilities doctrine is
“said to be codified” in statutory provisions recognizing no gain or loss on a distri-
bution of assets to shareholders in liquidation if certain conditions are met).
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a buyer, there was no further gain to be realized on the sale except to
the extent the buyer paid more than the fair market value of the as-
sets at the time of their distribution.6  The buyer would take the as-
sets with a basis equal to the buyer’s purchase price.  This technique
was widely understood7 and widely utilized.8  The ability to distribute
appreciated assets out of corporate solution without incurring a corpo-
rate-level tax is exactly what Congress deemed to be an area in need of
fundamental reform in 1986.9
6. Compare Comm’r v. Court Holding Co., 324 U.S. 331, 334 (1945) (corporation was
taxed on built-in gain on assets distributed prior to their sale by the shareholders
because “[t]he incidence of taxation depends upon the substance of a transaction.
The tax consequences which arise from gains from a sale of property are not fi-
nally to be determined solely by the means employed to transfer legal title.
Rather, the transaction must be viewed as a whole, and each step, from the com-
mencement of negotiations to the consummation of the sale, is relevant.  A sale
by one person cannot be transformed for tax purposes into a sale by another by
using the latter as a conduit through which to pass title.”), with United States v.
Cumberland Pub. Ser. Co., 338 U.S. 451, 454 (1950) (Court refused to attribute a
shareholder sale of distributed assets to the corporation where the shareholders
had first attempted to sell their stock to the buyer and then offered to liquidate
the corporation and sell the assets; the Court Holding decision was distinguished
because in Court Holding the sole purpose of the so-called liquidation was to dis-
guise a corporate sale).  The uncertainty caused by these two cases led Congress
in 1954 to enact old § 337, which ordinarily eliminated a tax at the corporate-
level on liquidation-sale transactions (except for recapture items, installment ob-
ligations, and nonbulk sales of inventory), whether the sale was made directly by
the corporation or was imputed to it under the Court Holding doctrine.  Congress
repealed old § 337 in 1986 because its continued existence was inconsistent with
the repeal of the General Utilities doctrine.
7. See, e.g., AMER. LAW INST., FEDERAL INCOME TAX PROJECT: SUBCHAPTER C, PRO-
POSALS ON CORPORATE ACQUISITIONS AND DISPOSITIONS 102–19 (1982); Beynard
Wolfman, Corporate Distributions of Appreciated Property: The Case for Repeal of
the General Utilities Doctrine, 22 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 81 (1985); John S. Nolan,
Taxing Corporate Distributions of Appreciated Property: Repeal of the General
Utilities Doctrine and Relief Measures, 22 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 97 (1985); Peter L.
Faber et al., Income Taxation of Corporations Making Distributions With Respect
to Their Stock, 37 TAX LAW. 625 (1984); Edward J. Hawkins, A Discussion of the
Repeal of General Utilities, 37 TAX LAW. 641 (1984).
8. See, e.g., Zenz v. Quinlivan, 213 F.2d 914 (6th Cir. 1954); Esmark, Inc. v. Comm’r,
90 T.C. 171 (1988), aff’d 886 F.2d 1318 (7th Cir. 1989).
9. See H.R. REP. NO. 99-426, at 282 (1985) (footnote omitted) (“[T]he General Utili-
ties rule tends to undermine the corporate income tax.  Under normally applica-
ble tax principles, nonrecognition of gain is available only if the transferee takes
a carryover basis in the transferred property, thus assuring that a tax will even-
tually be collected on the appreciation.  Where the General Utilities rule applies,
assets generally are permitted to leave corporate solution and to take a stepped-
up basis in the hands of the transferee without the imposition of a corporate-level
tax.  Thus, the effect of the rule is to grant a permanent exemption from the cor-
porate income tax.”).  The price of this basis step up is, at most, a single share-
holder-level capital gains tax (and perhaps recapture, tax benefit, and other
similar amounts). In some cases, moreover, payment of the capital gains tax is
deferred because the shareholder’s gain is reported under the installment
method.
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B. Tax Reform Act of 1986
In 1986, save for distributions that qualify for non-recognition
treatment under § 355,10 Congress repealed the last vestiges of the
General Utilities doctrine.11  The intent of this major tax reform effort
was to ensure that built-in gain property residing in corporate solu-
tion would be subject to corporate-level taxation when and if such
property was distributed out of corporate solution12 except where the
taxpayer was able to meet the rigorous requirements of § 355.  Con-
gress viewed the repeal of the General Utilities doctrine as a major
reform effort with broad-reaching impact.  In this regard, the Tax Re-
form Act of 1986 (1986 Act) was premised on the “classic view” that a
corporation should be taxed separately from and in addition to the tax
imposed on its owners.  Thus, corporate-level goodwill could no longer
be distributed as part of a liquidating distribution to the shareholders
without incurrence of a corporate-level tax.  Congress authorized the
Treasury Department to issue regulations to ensure that the purposes
of the repeal of the General Utilities doctrine were not circumvented
through the use of any provision of the law or regulations.13  At the
10. In 1990, Congress subsequently tightened the restrictions on § 355 by enacting
§ 355(d) to further protect against the use of § 355 as a technique to indirectly
sell a subsidiary without corporate-level gain.  Revenue Reconciliation Act of
1990, Pub. L. No. 101-508, § 11321, 104 Stat. 1388-460 (codified as amended in
I.R.C. § 355 (2006)).
11. See Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 631(a), 100 Stat. 2085, 2269;
I.R.C. § 311(b)(2) (2006); I.R.C. § 336(a) (2006).
12. See H.R. REP. NO. 99-841, pt. 2, at 204 (1986) (Conf. Rep.) (“The repeal of the
General Utilities doctrine is designed to require the corporate-level recognition of
gain on a corporation’s sale or distribution of appreciated property, irrespective of
whether it occurs in a liquidating or non-liquidating context.”).
13. See I.R.C. § 337(d) (2006); H.R. REP. NO. 99-841, pt. 2, at 204 (1986).  Shortly
after the 1986 Act, techniques were developed to circumvent the repeal of the
General Utilities doctrine.  One such technique, the son-of-mirror transaction, in-
volved a situation in which an acquiring company would acquire the stock of a
target company at fair market value. After the acquisition, the acquiring com-
pany would cause the target company to distribute its wanted assets to the ac-
quirer, thus generating gain within the acquirer’s consolidated group and thereby
increasing the acquirer’s basis in the stock of the target by the amount of that
gain.  The acquirer then could sell the target’s stock at a time when only un-
wanted assets were held by the target company.  As a result, an artificial loss was
created that approximated the amount of the previously recognized gain that oc-
curred upon the distribution of the wanted assets out of the target company.  The
IRS immediately responded to the son-of-mirror technique by issuing Notice 87-
14, 1987-1 C.B. 445, stating it would deny the intended tax benefits of a son-of-
mirror type transaction by future regulations having retroactive effect.  On Sept.
19, 1991, the IRS and Treasury Department published Treas. Reg. § 1.1502-20
(the loss disallowance rule). See T.D. 8364, 1991-2 C.B. 43.  On July 6, 2001, in
Rite Aid Corp. v. United States, 255 F.3d 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2001), the Court of Ap-
peals for the Federal Circuit held that the duplicated loss provisions of the loss
disallowance rules were an invalid exercise of regulatory authority.  Because only
the loss duplication factor of Treas. Reg. § 1.1502-20 was at issue in Rite Aid, the
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time, there were calls to adopt an integrated shareholder-corporate
tax regime,14 but those calls were rejected.
Moreover, the 1986 Act reduced individual tax rates to a maximum
tax rate of 28% while the maximum corporate tax rate, which had his-
torically been lower than the individual tax rate, was reduced to 34%.
This reform’s effect  was that the combined all-in shareholder-corpo-
rate tax rate that applies to C corporations was raised more than 24%
higher than the combined all-in owner-company tax rate that applies
to pass-through entities (e.g., S corporations and partnerships).15
IRS believes that the finding of invalidity applied only to that factor and not to
the factors dealing with the son-of-mirror problem.  See Notice 2002-11, 2002-1
C.B. 526 (“It is the Service’s position that the Rite Aid opinion implicates only the
loss duplication aspect of the loss disallowance regulation . . . .”).  In response to
the Rite Aid decision, the IRS and Treasury Department promulgated two regula-
tions to replace the loss disallowance rules.  The first, Temp. Treas. Reg.
§ 1.337(d)-2T (temporary General Utilities regulation), was published on March
12, 2002, to address the circumvention of General Utilities repeal. See T.D. 8984,
2002-1 C.B. 668.  The second, Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.1502-35T, was published on
March 14, 2003, to address the inappropriate duplication of loss. See T.D. 9048,
2003-1 C.B. 645.  T.D. 9048 also included certain related provisions promulgated
under Temp. Treas. Reg. §§ 1.1502-21T and § 1.1502-32T.  On March 3, 2005, the
temporary regulation was adopted without substantive change as final Treas.
Reg. § 1.337(d)-2. See T.D. 9187, 2005-1 C.B. 778.  On September 17, 2008, the
IRS and Treasury Department issued final unified rules for loss on subsidiary
stock through Treas. Reg. § 1.1502-36. See T.D. 9424, 2008-2 C.B. 1012.  For a
discussion of the final unified loss disallowance regulations that now represent
the end of this sordid tale, see David B. Friedel, Final Loss Disallowance Rules: A
New World Order, J. CORP. TAX’N, Nov.–Dec. 2008, at 33 (“To call these final rules
complicated would be a great understatement.”).  For a thorough analysis of the
final regulations, see DON LEATHERMAN, A Survey of §1.1502-36, in THE CORPO-
RATE TAX SERIES: STRATEGIES FOR ACQUISITIONS, DISPOSITIONS, SPIN-OFFS, JOINT
VENTURES, REORGANIZATIONS, & RESTRUCTURINGS (2010).
14. See U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, THE PRESIDENT’S PROPOSAL TO THE CONGRESS
FOR FAIRNESS, GROWTH, AND SIMPLICITY, 120–29 (1985), http://www.treasury.gov/
resource-center/tax-policy/Documents/pres85All.pdf; U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREA-
SURY, TAX REFORM FOR FAIRNESS, SIMPLICITY, AND ECONOMIC GROWTH: THE TREA-
SURY DEPARTMENT REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT, VOL. 2, 134–44 (1984), http://www.
treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/Documents/tres84v2All.pdf.  For an anal-
ysis of efforts for shareholder-corporate integration in the post-World War II era,
see Steven A. Bank, The Rise and Fall of Post-World War II Corporate Tax Re-
form, 73 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 207 (2010).
15. The double tax was ameliorated somewhat by enactment of the 15% rate on divi-
dends and capital gains in 2003. See Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation
Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-27, 117 Stat. 752.  However, even with this reduced
rate, the total tax burden for the C corporation form is still higher at 44.75% (35%
corporate tax plus 15% x 65% after-corporate tax profits) versus the top individ-
ual tax rate of 35% under current law.  This provision was originally set to expire
for tax years beginning after December 31, 2008, but the sunset date for the pref-
erential 15% rate on dividends and capital gains was extended to December 31,
2010 by the Tax Increase Prevention and Reconciliation Act of 2005, Pub. L. No.
109-222, 120 Stat. 345 (2006).  Congress again extended the sunset date to De-
cember 31, 2012, in the Tax Relief, Unemployment Insurance Reauthorization,
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C. Post-1986 Reaction
Notwithstanding the bold reform Congress instituted with the re-
peal of the General Utilities doctrine and its efforts to preserve the
corporate tax base, Congress left taxpayers with the ability to choose
whether to conduct their business activities in pass-through entities
or through separately taxable C corporations.  In response to the re-
forms implemented as part of the 1986 Act, the tax community has
engaged in an ongoing effort to transform the manner in which busi-
ness is conducted in the United States by migrating business activi-
ties into pass-through entity structures.16  Perhaps as a result of this
effort, an impressive number of C corporations have been electing to
change from C corporation status to S corporation status.17  This
trend can be traced back to the adoption of the reforms implemented
as part of the 1986 Act.18  However,  the utility of such conversions
has limits.
In this regard, S corporation status allows pass-through treatment
for income earned prospectively.  However, § 1374 imposes a tax on a
converted C corporation’s built-in gains19 that are recognized during
and Job Creation Act of 2010 Pub. L. No. 111-312, 125 Stat. 3296.  The current
administration has criticized any further extension of the sunset date.  Press Re-
lease, Office of the White House (August 2, 2011).
16. According to calculations based on IRS Statistics of Income data from 2004 to
2008, individual owners of flow-through businesses earned 54% of all business
net income.  Robert Carroll and Gerald Prante, The Flow-Through Business Sec-
tor and Tax Reform, S-CORPORATION ASS’N, at 9 (April 2011), http://www.s-corp.
org/wp-content/uploads/2011/04/Flow-Through-Report-Final-2011-04-08.pdf.
17. During the 2000–2006 time period, between 78,000 and 97,000 C corporations
converted to S corporations per year, representing 23%–31% of all new corpora-
tions. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-10-195, TAX GAP: ACTIONS
NEEDED TO ADDRESS NON-COMPLIANCE WITH S CORPORATION TAX RULES 9 (2009).
18. Whereas the annual growth in the number of S corporation returns was 9.5%
during the 1959–1986 period, the number of S corporations grew by 36% between
1986 and 1987.  George A. Plesko, The Role of Taxes in Organizational Choice: S
Conversions After the Tax Reform Act of 1986, MASS. INST. OF TECH., http://web.
mit.edu/gplesko/www/Plesko%20Sconv.pdf (last visited Feb. 18, 2012).  S corpora-
tions represented approximately 5% of businesses in 1986. JOINT COMM. ON
TAX’N, Tax Reform: Selected Federal Tax Issues Relating to Small Business and
Choice of Entity (June 4, 2008), http://www.jct.gov/x-48-08.pdf.  In 2006, S corpo-
rations represented 12.6% of all businesses and grew by 35% from 2000 to 2006 to
account for nearly 4 million businesses.  GAO-10-195, supra, at 9.
19. In general terms, built-in gain is the amount by which the fair market value of
the assets of a converted C corporation exceeds the aggregate adjusted bases of
the assets.  I.R.C. § 1374(d)(1) (Supp. 2010).  The tax is imposed if: (i) the S elec-
tion was made after 1986; (ii) the converted C corporation has a net recognized
built-in gain within the recognition period; or (iii) the net recognized built-in gain
for the tax year does not exceed the net unrealized built-in gain minus the net
recognized built-in gain for prior years in the recognition period, to the extent
that such gains were subject to tax. Id. § 1374(c).
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the prescribed post-S election recognition period.20   As a result, where
possible, tax advisors have advised closely-held businesses to convert
from C corporation status to S corporation status, and then to delay
any sale of appreciated built-in gain assets until after the close of the
§ 1374 recognition period.  Such planning can minimize corporate-
level tax under certain circumstances.  However, given the extended
length of the recognition period for purposes of § 1374’s application
(minimum seven years for dispositions occurring in 2009 and 2010,21
minimum of five years for dispositions occurring in 2011,22 and a min-
imum of ten years for dispositions occurring in all other years23), this
delay is unacceptably long when the shareholders desire to sell the
business in the near future.24  What is more, the conversion to S cor-
poration status imposes mechanical restrictions on the number of
shareholders, the types and residency of shareholders, and the types
of stock that can be owned by shareholders.25  Thus, although conver-
sion to an S corporation provides a path to avoid corporate-level taxa-
tion, the election of S corporation status is not an immediate path to
the avoidance of corporate-level tax on appreciated built-in gain prop-
erty.  Conversion also creates some operational and ownership con-
straints that would not exist if the company were operated in a
partnership or C corporation form.
20. The “recognition period” generally is the ten-year period beginning on the first
day on which the corporation is taxed as an S corporation or acquires C corpora-
tion assets in a carryover basis transaction. Id. § 1374(d)(7), (8).  Thus, a disposi-
tion of appreciated property during this period of time will be subject to a
corporate-level tax in addition to the shareholder-level tax.  However, Congress
has shortened the recognition period in two instances.  First, for taxable years
beginning in 2009 and 2010, no tax is imposed on the net built-in gain recognized
in either of those years if the seventh taxable year is in the ten-year period pre-
ceding that taxable year. Id. § 1374(d)(7)(B).  The second instance where Con-
gress shortened the recognition period was in The Small Business Jobs Act of
2010, which temporarily shortens the recognition period to five years but only for
dispositions occurring in taxable years beginning in 2011.  The tax is computed
by applying the highest corporate income tax rate to the converted C corpora-
tion’s net recognized built-in gain for the taxable year. Id. § 1374(b)(1).
21. Id. § 1374(d)(7)(B), amended by American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of
2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, § 1251, 123 Stat. 115, 342.
22. Small Business Jobs Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-240, § 2014(a), 124 Stat. 2504,
2556.  Enacted on September 27, 2010, the Act reduces the S corporation built-in
gain holding period from ten years to seven years for dispositions occurring dur-
ing 2009 and 2010 and to five years for dispositions occurring during 2011. Id.;
I.R.C. § 1374(d)(7)(B).
23. I.R.C. § 1374(d)(8)(B)(i); S. REP. NO. 100-445, at 65 (1988).
24. See, e.g., Martin Ice Cream v. Comm’r, 110 T.C. 189, 191, 203 (1998) (Martin Ice
Cream, a historic C corporation, elected S corporation status on November 1,
1987 but was sold shortly thereafter on July 22, 1988).
25. See JAMES S. EUSTICE & JOEL D. KUNTZ, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF CORPORA-
TIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS ¶5.01 (4th ed. 2001 & Supp. 2011).
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Another alternative for reducing exposure to corporate-level taxa-
tion is to convert from C corporation status to partnership status.26
Since the advent of the so-called “check-the-box” regime in 1997, tax-
payers have been given the ability to elect the tax classification of bus-
iness entities organized as partnerships or limited liability companies
under state law.27  Accordingly, it is relatively convenient to preserve
the non-tax benefits provided by corporate status (principally limited
liability) while converting to an organizational form that can be taxed
as a partnership for federal tax purposes.  However, in light of the
repeal of the General Utilities doctrine, a significant disadvantage of
this alternative is that the conversion of an existing C corporation into
a tax partnership generally represents a taxable event to both the C
corporation and its shareholders.28  Depending on the existence of tax
attributes such as a net operating loss carryforward or the valuation
of the overall business, this form of tax planning may nonetheless
make sense, particularly in a market downturn.  However, the cost of
such a conversion often is prohibitively expensive.  Accordingly, not-
withstanding the opportunities afforded for doing so, many closely-
held C corporations are unable to usefully convert to pass-through sta-
tus in a timely manner.
D. Section 7704
Shortly after the 1986 Act was enacted, several publicly traded
companies attempted to disincorporate by means of the use of a
master limited partnership.29  In response to this effort and to protect
the corporate tax base from what Congress perceived to be a signifi-
cant threat,30 Congress enacted § 7704.  The statute in general pre-
vents publicly traded entities, with some important exceptions, from
being treated as pass-through entities.31  Although Congress re-
26. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-3(g)(1)(ii) (2011).  The total number of partnerships actu-
ally declined between 1986 and 1987 due in part to changes to the passive activ-
ity loss rules, but the amount of income reported by partnerships with positive
ordinary income increased by 9% during that period.  Susan Nelson & Tom Pet-
ska, Partnerships, Passive Losses, and Tax Reform, 9 SOI BULL. 31 (Winter
1990), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/81-87papltxrf.pdf.
27. Simplification of Entity Classification Rules, 61 Fed. Reg. 66,584, 66,588–66,592
(Dec. 18, 1996), revising Treas. Reg. §§ 301.7701-1, -2, & -3.  The effective date of
the regulations was January 1, 1997. See also I.R.S. Notice 95-14, 1995-1 C.B.
297 (stating that IRS and the Treasury Department are “considering simplifying
the classification regulations”). See Treas. Reg. §§ 301.7701-1(f), 301.7701-2(e), &
301.7701-3(f)(1).
28. I.R.C. § 311(b) (2006); Id. § 331.
29. H.R. REP. NO. 100-391, pt. 1, at 1065 (1987).
30. See Marvin F. Milich, Master Limited Partnerships, 20 REAL EST. L.J. 54, 63
(1991).
31. Congress enacted § 7704 in the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1987, Pub.
L. No. 100-203, § 10211, 101 Stat. 1330, 1330–403–405 (1987).  This public law
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sponded by protecting against the disincorporation of the corporate
tax base with respect to publicly-traded entities through the enact-
ment of § 7704, Congress in 1987 again retained the taxpayers’ ability
to utilize partnerships or S corporations for nonpublicly traded busi-
nesses.  In testimony before the Joint Select Committee on Deficit Re-
duction, Thomas Barthold, Joint Committee on Taxation Chief of
Staff, provided the following diagram, which well summarizes the
transformation that occurred in the tax status of how business was
conducted since the 1986 Act:32
Number of C Corporation Returns Compared to the Sum of
S Corporation and Partnership Returns, 1978-2008
As indicated by the above chart, the use of C corporations to con-
duct business activity continues to decline, and so the corporate in-
come tax applies to a shrinking subset of business activities conducted
within the United States.  Thus, although Congress blocked the exit
for most publicly traded companies through the adoption of § 7704, it
also enacted I.R.C. § 469(k), which applies the passive loss rules to master lim-
ited partnerships, and I.R.C. § 512(c)(2), which treats income from master limited
partnerships as unrelated trade or business income.
32. Testimony of the Staff of the J. Comm. on Taxation Before the Select Comm. on
Deficit Reduction, 112th Cong. 10 (2011)  (testimony of Thomas A. Barhold, Chief
of Staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation), http://www.jct.gov/publications.
html?func=startdown&id=4363 (line in chart highlighting 1986 date added by
the authors).
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left in place the means of side-stepping the corporate tax regime for
nonpublicly traded companies by leaving in place the ability of taxpay-
ers to conduct their business in pass-through entity structures.
III. SUBSTANTIVE ANALYSIS
In situations where the ability to change the status of a C corpora-
tion into a pass-through entity does not provide an effective means to
timely escape the corporate-level tax, tax planners have attempted to
argue that some or all of the goodwill associated with the business
conducted by the C corporation is in fact not a corporate asset but in-
stead is a shareholder asset, i.e., “personal goodwill,” the disposition of
which is not subject to corporate-level taxation.  To help guide the dis-
cussion of this section, this Article posits the following hypothetical
fact pattern in order to frame the relevant issues for analysis:
EXAMPLE:  The sole Shareholder organized a C corporation and has been
directly involved in managing and developing the business that it conducts.
The Shareholder is an employee and has received a salary since the inception
of the C corporation.  The Shareholder has developed customer contacts, client
relationships, customer lists, and has built the reputation of the C corpora-
tion.  No formal employment agreement exists and no intangible property
agreements have been put into place between the Shareholder and the C cor-
poration.33  After many years of developing the business, the Shareholder
now desires to sell the C corporation for $50 million.  The tangible assets of
the C corporation have a book value and fair market value of $5 million and a
tax basis of $2 million.  The Shareholder claims that the remaining $45 mil-
lion of value is attributable to goodwill owned and created by the Shareholder.
Thus, the Shareholder wants to claim that $45 million of the purchase price
represents a payment for the Shareholder’s personal goodwill that is not sub-
ject to corporate-level taxation, and thus is subject to taxation only once (to
the Shareholder) at long-term capital gains rates.34
Because goodwill was not subject to depreciation prior to the adop-
tion of § 197 in 1993, significant litigation under prior law occurred
over the ability of taxpayers to identify separate and distinct intangi-
ble assets that have a fixed life (and, thus, are subject to an allowance
33. Consequently, the arrangement between the Shareholder and the controlled C
corporation in the Example fails to meet the requirements for a qualified cost-
sharing agreement within the meaning of the Treasury regulations. See Treas.
Reg. § 1.482-7T(b) and (k) (2010).
34. The publication of recent articles regarding personal goodwill is indicative of
growing interest in this planning technique. See Michael F. Lynch, David J.
Beausejour & David B. Casten, Personal Goodwill: Three Recent Taxpayer
Defeats Nevertheless Affirm Existence of a Sometimes Forgotten Asset, 28 J. TAX’N
INV. 29 (Winter 2011); Robert W. Wood, The Emperor of Ice Cream, Dentists, and
Personal Goodwill, TAX NOTES TODAY, Nov. 15, 2010, available at LEXIS 2010
TNT 221-10; Robert W. Wood, Personal Goodwill and the Emperor of Ice Cream,
M&A TAX REP., Oct. 2010, at 1. See also Jerome M. Schwartzman, The Intangible
Intangible: Increasing Value of a Deal Using Personal Goodwill, J. CORP. TAX’N,
Sept.–Oct. 2009, at 12 (detailing Martin Ice Cream Co. and other notions of per-
sonal goodwill).
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for depreciation or amortization).35  To provide certainty in this area,
Congress enacted § 197 to generally allow all purchased intangible
property, including goodwill, to be amortized over a fifteen-year pe-
riod.36  For purposes of § 197, the Treasury regulations promulgated
under § 197 state that goodwill means “the value of a trade or busi-
ness attributable to the expectancy of continued customer patronage”
and “may be due to the name or reputation of a trade or business or
any other factor.”37  The regulations go on to distinguish goodwill from
other intangible property including going concern value, customer
based intangibles, trademarks and trade names, and workforce in
place.  However, for purposes of amortization, § 197 makes no signifi-
cant distinction between these various intangible assets.
Although distinguishing between goodwill and other intangibles is
no longer required for depreciation purposes due to the enactment of
§ 197, such distinctions are still relevant for transfer pricing purposes
under § 482.  Specifically, for transfer pricing purposes, an intangible
asset constitutes either “residual goodwill” that is not a separate and
distinct asset (from associated operating assets) and thus is not sepa-
rately transferrable or, in the alternative, a “marketing intangible”
that is categorized as a separate and distinct intangible asset (such as
customer lists, know-how, customer reputation, and other similar
items that are collectively known as “marketing intangibles” in the
nomenclature used in § 482 cases) that can be segregated and sepa-
rately disposed of as a separate and distinct item.  However, as dis-
cussed further below, the creation, ownership, and transfer of a
marketing intangible among related parties (such as in the context of
35. Prior to adoption of § 197, Treas. Reg. § 1.167(a)-3 (2011) provided that “No de-
duction for depreciation is allowable with respect to goodwill.”  Accordingly, ef-
forts to identify intangible property that was distinct from goodwill, and thus
depreciable, led to substantial litigation.
36. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-66, § 13261, 107
Stat. 312, 532–41.
37. Treas. Reg. § 1.197-2(b)(1) (2010).  For some of the prior litigation over the ques-
tion of what constituted goodwill, see, e.g., Des Moines Gas Co. v. Des Moines,
238 U.S. 153, 165 (1915) (describing goodwill as the aspect of a trade or business
associated with the “fixed and favorable consideration of customers, arising from
an established and well-known and well-conducted business”); Newark Morning
Ledger Co. v. United States, 507 U.S. 546, 555–56 (1993) (favorably citing the
quotation from Des Moines Gas and stating that the “shorthand description of
goodwill as ‘the expectancy of continued patronage’ provides a useful label with
which to identify the total of all the imponderable qualities that attract custom-
ers to the business”); Metro. Nat’l Bank v. St. Louis Dispatch Co., 149 U.S. 436,
446 (1893) (quoting Justice Story’s definition of goodwill: “the advantage or bene-
fit . . . from constant or habitual customers”); Winn-Dixie Montgomery, Inc. v.
United States, 444 F.2d 677, 681 (5th Cir. 1971) (describing goodwill as the “ex-
pectancy that ‘the old customers will resort to the old place’”); Houston Chronicle
Publ’g Co. v. United States, 481 F.2d 1240, 1247 (5th Cir. 1973) (favorably quot-
ing Winn-Dixie Montgomery).
182 NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 91:170
the Example) is subject to and governed by the transfer pricing rules
of § 482.
In order for § 482 to apply in the context of the Example, the con-
trolled C corporation and its controlling shareholder-employee must
be engaged in two separate trades or businesses.  The two-business
requirement is readily satisfied if the shareholder-employee renders
services not only to the controlled corporation but also in his or her
personal capacity to unrelated third parties.38  However, the majority
of cases also hold that this two-business requirement is satisfied even
if the shareholder-employee works exclusively for the controlled C cor-
poration on the ground that the shareholder’s business as an employee
is separate from the business conducted by the controlled C
corporation.39
A divergent view on this issue was expressed in Foglesong v. Com-
missioner.40  In Foglesong, the Seventh Circuit reversed the Tax
Court’s allocation of 98% of a personal service corporation’s income
that was allocated by the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) under § 482
to the controlling shareholder-employee.  In its decision, the Seventh
Circuit stated that the controlling shareholder had no other business
and no other business assets apart from that of its controlled C corpo-
ration, and as a result the Seventh Circuit concluded that the two-
business requirement of § 482 was not satisfied.41  However, in distin-
38. See, e.g., Borge v. Comm’r, 405 F.2d 673 (2d Cir. 1968); Danica Enter., Inc. v.
Comm’r, 395 U.S. 933 (1969) (entertainer shifted part of his income to wholly
owned corporation; reallocation upheld under I.R.C. § 482); see also Rev. Rul. 74-
331, 1974-2 C.B. 282 (applying § 482 in closely-held context); Rev. Rul. 74-330,
1974-2 C.B. 278 (same).
39. See Dolese v. Comm’r, 811 F2d 543 (10th Cir. 1987) (separate businesses found);
Rubin v. Comm’r, 460 F.2d 1216 (2d Cir. 1972) (management services furnished
to controlled corporation, which contracted services to third party for higher
amount); Ach v. Comm’r, 358 F.2d 342 (6th Cir. 1966) (successful proprietorship
transferred to corporation controlled by owner’s son; portion of business profits
allocated to transferor, who continued to manage enterprise); Leavell v. Comm’r,
104 T.C. 140 (1995) (100% allocation to earner under I.R.C. § 61 assignment of
income doctrine); Haag v. Comm’r, 88 T.C. 604 (1987), aff’d, 855 F.2d 855 (8th
Cir. 1988) (reallocation of income between corporation and shareholder-physician
by reason of I.R.C. § 482); Keller v. Comm’r, 77 T.C. 1014, 1022 (1981), aff’d, 723
F.2d 58 (10th Cir. 1983) (applying I.R.C. § 482 but finding salary reasonable).
40. Foglesong v. Comm’r, 691 F.2d 848 (7th Cir. 1982).
41. This holding has been questioned as ill-conceived by several respected commenta-
tors. See Elliott Manning, The Service Corporation—Who Is Taxable on Its In-
come: Reconciling Assignment of Income Principles, Section 482, and Section 351,
37 U. Miami L. Rev. 657, 677 (1983); 1 BORIS I. BITTKER & JAMES EUSTICE, FED-
ERAL INCOME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS ¶2.07[4] &
¶13.20[2][b] (7th ed. 2006 & Supp. 2011); 2 BORIS I. BITTKER & JAMES EUSTICE,
FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS ¶¶13.20[2][b]
(7th ed. 2006 & Supp. 2011); BORIS I. BITTKER, MARTIN J. MCMAHON, JR., & LAW-
RENCE A. ZELENAK, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF INDIVIDUALS ¶37.02 (3d ed.
2011) (stating that the weight of authority is contrary); CYM LOWELL, PETER
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guishing contrary authorities, the Seventh Circuit said the facts in Fo-
glesong did not satisfy the two-business requirement of § 482 because
“[b]y contrast, Foglesong transferred all of his business to the corpora-
tion and retained nothing.”42  In the context of the Example, the
Shareholder is claiming that it did not transfer everything and in-
stead retained something—most notably the shareholder-employee
attempted to retain personal goodwill.  In this context, the Share-
holder in the Example claims that a separate shareholder-only asset
exists and is peculiarly owned by the Shareholder and not by the con-
trolled C corporation.  It is at this point that the two-business require-
ment of § 482 has been satisfied even under the Seventh Circuit’s
reasoning in Foglesong.  Nevertheless, even with it said that § 482 ap-
pears applicable even under the reasoning set forth by the Seventh
Circuit in Foglesong, the Foglesong rationale remains a minority view.
The Tax Court refuses to follow Foglesong outside of the Seventh Cir-
cuit,43 and the IRS refuses to follow it at all.44  The implications of
§ 482 to the fact pattern set forth in the Example are set forth in
section III.A.
Residual goodwill is not separately distinct from the underlying
business to which it relates and thus cannot be sold independent of
the operating assets of the business itself.  This is why the § 482 regu-
lations do not classify residual goodwill or going concern value as an
intangible asset that is subject to transfer pricing analysis.  Residual
goodwill cannot be separated from the operating business assets.45
Accordingly, when a business is conducted in a C corporation, any
BRIGER & MARK MARTIN, U.S. INTERNATIONAL TRANSFER PRICING ¶13.06 (WG&L
2011).  The applicability of § 482 to closely-held corporations including personal
service corporations has been discussed for many years. See John. E. Scheifly,
The Commissioner’s Attacks upon Personal Service Corporations, in 19TH ANNUAL
TUL. TAX INST. 336 (1970); Richard D. Hobbet, The Corporate Entity: When Will It
Be Recognized for Federal Tax Purposes? 30 J. TAX’N 74 (1969); Stanton D. Rosen-
baum, Entertainer’s Corporations and Capital Gains, 12 TAX L. REV. 33 (1956).
42. Foglesong, 691 F.2d at 852.
43. See, e.g., Johnston v. Comm’r, 80 T.C.M. 477 (2000).
44. Rev. Rul. 88-38, 1988-1 C.B. 246 (IRS states that it will not follow Foglesong on
the applicability of I.R.C. § 482).
45. I.R.C. § 936(h)(3)(B) (Supp. 2010) (sets forth a list of separate and distinct in-
tangibles independent of services and excludes residual goodwill from the list);
Treas. Reg. § 1.482-4(b) (2010) (sets forth the same list as I.R.C. § 936 and states
that this list of intangibles represents intangible property subject to I.R.C. § 482,
but inseparable residual goodwill is excluded from the list); Treas. Reg.
§ 1.367(a)-1T(d)(5)(iii) (2011) (cross-references I.R.C. § 936(h)(3)(B)’s list of assets
that are separate and distinct intangibles subject to I.R.C. § 367(d) but indicates
that foreign goodwill and foreign going concern value are not subject to I.R.C.
§ 367(d) and that these items represent residual value after all separate and dis-
tinct assets have been identified and are inseparable from the business); Treas.
Reg. § 1.367(a)-6T(c)(3) (2011) (confirms that residual goodwill resides with the
business assets and is transferred with the business assets).
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residual goodwill of the business resides with the business assets held
by the C corporation and not with any other person.  Similarly, when a
business is conducted as a sole proprietorship, the residual goodwill is
held by the sole proprietor but only as an integral part of the operating
business assets.  The authorities that discuss this issue are set forth
below in section III.B.
The question presented in the Example is whether the personal
goodwill can be maintained as a marketing intangible that the Share-
holder can separately own and convey to another person or instead
must be treated as residual goodwill held by the C corporation (or per-
haps another item that is not separately transferrable by the Share-
holder).  The following discussion sets forth an analysis of the various
permutations with respect to this question.
A. Marketing Intangibles
If a separate and distinct asset were found to factually exist in the
fact pattern set forth in the Example, the courts would likely classify
this separate and distinct intangible as a “marketing intangible.”  In
this regard, in Eli Lilly & Co. v. Commissioner46 the Tax Court helped
clarify the distinction between manufacturing intangibles, which were
owned by a controlled subsidiary in that case, from marketing in-
tangibles, which were owned by the US shareholder.  In Eli Lilly, the
Tax Court found that the marketing intangibles owned by Eli Lilly
(the U.S. shareholder) included the trademarks for certain pharma-
ceutical compounds as well as the Lilly name and goodwill of the com-
pany.  In describing the marketing intangible owned at the
shareholder-level, the Tax Court said that Eli Lilly, as shareholder,
enjoyed a favorable reputation in the marketplace and had developed
a highly skilled marketing organization.  The court found that this
factual situation indicated that a marketing intangible existed at the
parent-shareholder level and had significant value apart from the pat-
ents owned by the controlled manufacturing subsidiary.  The Tax
Court then stated that the marketing intangibles were owned by Eli
Lilly because the costs to develop this market recognition, trade name,
and customer goodwill had been funded entirely by Eli Lilly, the par-
ent-shareholder, without reimbursement by the controlled manufac-
turing subsidiary.47  Other courts have similarly held that marketing
46. 84 T.C. 996 (1985), aff’d in part, rev’d on other grounds, 856 F.2d 855 (7th Cir.
1988).
47. See also GD Searle & Co. v. Comm’r, 88 T.C. 252 (1987) (holding that transferred
manufacturing intangibles had “little value” apart from the intangibles associ-
ated with the “marketing and administrative services” provided by Searle.  The
court then engaged in an effort to bifurcate the combined company goodwill be-
tween the manufacturing intangible owned by the manufacturing subsidiary and
the marketing intangible owned by the distributor subsidiary).  Arguably the
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intangibles also can include customer lists, trademarks, trade names,
brand names, and related customer goodwill,48 and the government
has asserted an even more expansive scope of situations where a mar-
keting intangible might exist in its litigating positions.49
Because marketing intangibles can be separately owned, con-
trolled, and transferred, the creation and ultimate transfer of these
intangibles are the subject of significant attention under § 482, as dis-
cussed more fully in the remainder of this section III.A.
1. Transfer Pricing Rules
The Treasury regulations under § 482 make clear that the finan-
cial benefits of “marketing intangibles” must be analyzed under a
gauntlet of § 482 tests when these intangibles are created by related
parties.50  Thus, in order to determine whether the allocation set forth
in the Example will be respected, it is necessary to analyze how § 482
would impact the tax planning posited in the Example.
highest profile contest involving a marketing intangible was GlaxoSmithKline
Holdings (Americas), Inc. v. Comm’r, T.C. Nos. 5750-04 and 6959-05, where the
IRS assessed a $4.6 billion tax deficiency against the U.S. distribution subsidiary
of a U.K.-based pharmaceutical manufacturer based on the purported value of
marketing intangibles developed and used by the subsidiary.  The case was ulti-
mately settled prior to trial.  I.R.S. News Release IR-2006-142 (Sept. 11, 2006).
48. See, e.g., Clarke v. Haberle Crystol Springs Brewing Co., 280 US 384 (1930)
(goodwill in the nature of trademarks, trade names and trade brands); JC Cornil-
lie Co. v. United States, 298 F. Supp. 887 (E.D. Mich. 1968) (goodwill in the form
of customer lists); and Drybrough v. Comm’r, 45 T.C. 424 (1966), aff’d, 384 F.2d
715 (6th Cir. 1967) (goodwill consisting of agency’s file of uncollected claims). See
also I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 8134193 (May 29, 1981) (defining “marketing in-
tangibles” as the right to use tradename, trademark, and related goodwill).
49. The IRS has taken an expansive view of what constitutes an intangible in several
instances. See FSA 200230001 (project finance developer’s efforts to negotiate a
comprehensive package of interdependent contracts to finance, construct, and op-
erate a project constituted an intangible asset).  Arguably, FSA 200230001 is in-
consistent with the result reached in Hosp. Corp. of Am., Inc. v. Comm’r, 81 T.C.
520 (1985), nonacq. in part 1987-2 C.B. 1, where the Tax Court rejected the IRS’s
characterization of the negotiation of the terms of a hospital management con-
tract as a transfer of property on the grounds that what was provided by the
taxpayer did not represent a legally enforceable right and was, at best, merely a
business opportunity. See also I.R.S. Tech. Adv. Mem. 200907024 (Feb. 13, 2009)
(stating that a network of contracts with independent foreign agents constitutes
intangible asset apart from goodwill for purposes of § 367(d)); Merck & Co. v.
United States, 24 Cl. Ct. 73 (1991) (showing that the government argued unsuc-
cessfully that the taxpayer’s strategic planning structure and system of intercom-
pany pricing were services requiring an arm’s-length payment from the
subsidiary to the taxpayer).
50. See, e.g., Treas. Reg. § 1.482-1(d)(3)(ii)(C) (Ex. 4) (2010) (example posits a case
involving “marketing intangibles”); see also 1988 White Paper, Notice 88-123,
1988-2 CB 458, 497 (stating that the I.R.C. § 936 definition of intangible prop-
erty, which is identical to the definition contained in I.R.C. § 482, includes mar-
keting intangibles).
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The first inquiry to be made under the final Treasury regulations
promulgated under § 482 is to determine whether the intangible has
“substantial value independent of the services of any individual.”51  If
not, then no separate marketing intangibles will be respected and val-
ued for US tax purposes.52  Thus, when controlling shareholders have
provided ongoing services to their controlled C corporation, the share-
holders must demonstrate that the results of these personal services
are the creation of a marketing intangible containing significant value
independent of the services performed on behalf of the controlled C
corporation and by necessity that the cash compensation paid to the
Shareholder was inadequate.53  If not, then whatever intangible value
is created as a result of the shareholders’ services inures to the benefit
of the service recipient, namely the controlled C corporation, i.e., the C
corporation in the Example.
The above approach is consistent with prior judicial decisions.  In
this regard, in Medieval Attractions, N.V. v. Commissioner,54 the Tax
51. Treas. Reg. § 1.482-4(b) (2010) (emphasis added).
52. See id.; see also Seagate Tech., Inc. v. Comm’r, 102 T.C. 149 (1994) (finding a
distinction between marketing intangibles for which a royalty was charged and
increased under § 482 by the court, and marketing services provided under a
“Marketing Agreement”).
53. See Veritas Software Corp. v. Comm’r, 133 T.C. 297 (2009).  This case primarily
addressed a cost sharing buy-in payment, but the Tax Court found no evidence to
support a finding that the transfer of access to U.S. based R&D and marketing
teams was the transfer of an intangible.  As part of this discussion, the court
included the following in a footnote:
Even if such evidence existed, these items would not be taken into ac-
count in calculating the requisite buy-in payment because they do not
have “substantial value independent of the services of any individual”
and thus do not meet the requirements of § 936(h)(3)(B) or § 1.482-4(b),
Income Tax Regs. “Access to research and development team” and “ac-
cess to marketing team” are not set forth in § 936(h)(3)(B) or § 1.482-
4(b), Income Tax Regs. Therefore, to be considered intangible property
for § 482 purposes, each item must meet the definition of a “similar
item” and have “substantial value independent of the services of any in-
dividual.”  § 936(h)(3)(B); § 1.482-4(b), Income Tax Regs.  The value, if
any, of access to VERITAS US’ R&D and marketing teams is based pri-
marily on the services of individuals (i.e., the work, knowledge, and
skills of team members).  Nevertheless, respondent in support of his con-
tention cites Newark Morning Ledger Co. v. United States,  507 U.S. 546
(1993), and Ithaca Indus., Inc. v. Commissioner,  97 T.C. 253 (1991), affd.
17 F.3d 684 (4th Cir. 1994).  These cases, however, do not suggest that
access to an R&D or marketing team has substantial value independent
of the services of an individual, do not define intangibles for § 482 pur-
poses, and do not even reference § 482.  We note that in December 2008,
the Secretary promulgated temporary regulations (i.e., secs. 1.482-1T
through 1.482-9T, Temporary Income Tax Regs., supra) which reference
“assembled workforce.”  In addition, the administration, in 2009, pro-
posed to change the law to include “workforce in place” in the § 482 defi-
nition of intangible.
Veritas, 133 T.C. at 323 n.31.
54. Medieval Attractions, N.V. v. Comm’r, 72 T.C.M. 924 (CCH) (T.C. 1996) .
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Court held that the taxpayer, a newly created U.S. operating subsidi-
ary, owned the name and concept behind its entertainment package
and therefore could not deduct franchise and royalty payments made
to its foreign shareholder.  Even though the idea for a medieval en-
tertainment facility and show could be traced back to one of the ulti-
mate foreign shareholders and the relevant trademark and copyright
registrations were filed in the name of the foreign shareholder, the
Tax Court found several deficiencies.  The concept of a medieval en-
tertainment program was not subject to legal protection, the name
used in connection with the taxpayer’s program was the taxpayer’s
name, the specific entertainment package used by the taxpayer was
developed and modified by the taxpayer’s employees and funded by
the taxpayer, and the trademark and copyright registrations were un-
dertaken after the fact in connection with tax advice.  Thus, the court
found that there was no separately created intangible warranting sep-
arate economic value to be paid to the foreign shareholder.55
The above restriction would seem to be a significant restriction in
the fact pattern set forth in the Example.  The Shareholder’s ongoing
business development activities in the Example are intrinsically
linked to the personal services performed for the corporation.  The ser-
vices in the Example arguably represent routine marketing, develop-
ment, and advertising services.  In this fact pattern, where the C
corporation bears the cost of these services from inception, the Share-
holder should have the burden to demonstrate that the Shareholder’s
activities created a significant intangible somehow independent of the
services provided to and paid for by the corporation.  In the event that
the Shareholder in the Example was unable to meet this burden, the
goodwill attendant with the favorable business reputation belongs to
the C corporation in the Example.56
However, even assuming that the Shareholder were able to sustain
this factual burden and demonstrate that a significant marketing in-
tangible with value independent of the services the shareholder pro-
vided to the C corporation does in fact exist, the inquiry then shifts to
the question of which person (the shareholder or C corporation) is en-
titled to receive the financial benefit arising from the marketing
intangible.
As an initial matter in the case of legally protected intangibles, the
final regulations under § 482 confirm that the legal ownership of in-
tangibles will be respected so long as the legal ownership of the intan-
gible has economic substance.57  In several cases discussed in section
55. Id.
56. The authorities discussing the inseparability of residual goodwill from the overall
business assets are set forth infra section III.B.
57. See Treas. Reg. § 1.482-4(f)(3).  The preamble to the proposed regulations preced-
ing the final regulations makes clear that this aspect of the regulations was in
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III.B., taxpayers have attempted to make much of the fact that no con-
tractual ownership rights existed that could be deemed to have been
transferred by the shareholder to the controlled C corporation.  And,
in the Example, it is posited that no employment agreement exists.
However, the § 482 regulations provide the IRS with authority to
deem the existence of such a contractual relationship if that better
accords with the economic substance of the arrangement,58 and this
would appear to be the case if the C corporation has borne the market-
ing, advertising, client development, and business development ex-
penses.  Given the expansive scope set forth in the final regulations
for recasting the tax ownership of a marketing intangible away from
the true legal owner when such owner did not bear the cost or expense
of creating the intangible or was fully reimbursed for its creation, this
aspect of the § 482 regulations creates significant authority for the
IRS to disregard the shareholder’s purported legal ownership in the
Example.  The reason is that even though no licensing agreements or
other contractual arrangements were put in place with respect to the
marketing intangible in the Example, the C corporation funded the
cost that created and enhanced the value of the intangible, and, as a
consequence, it became the economic owner of the intangible.
Moreover, the final regulations provide an entirely different ap-
proach for intangibles, including marketing intangibles, that are not
legally protected or exist under circumstances in which the true legal
owner is unclear.  In such a situation, the § 482 regulations treat the
party that has practical “control” over the intangible as the sole
owner.59  The § 482 regulations provide an example to illustrate this
alternative where the ownership of the intangible was unclear but
where the licensee of a trademark bore the cost associated with devel-
oping the list of customers that regularly purchased goods marketed
under the trademark.60  In this Example 2, it is assumed that intellec-
tual property law did not specify whether the licensor or the licensee
was the owner of the list.  Because the licensee—which is in the same
posture as the C corporation in the Example—has knowledge of the
response to criticism of the 1994 regulations’ ownership rule as inconsistent with
intellectual property law and general tax principles for determining ownership.
T.D. 9278, 2006-2 C.B. 256.
58. Treas. Reg. § 1.482-1(d)(3)(ii)(B)(1).
59. Treas. Reg. § 1.482-4(f)(3)(i)(A).  The final regulations’ determination to look at
effective control over an intangible is a departure from the 1994 regulations’ ap-
proach of looking to the party who bore the largest portion of the development
costs as the owner of the intangible.  For the reasons discussed in the text accom-
panying notes 57–60, the determination of legal ownership is not determinative
of how the economic benefit of the marketing intangible ultimately will be allo-
cated among related parties.
60. See Treas. Reg. § 1.482-4(f)(3)(ii) Ex.2.
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contents of the list and has practical control over its use and dissemi-
nation, the licensee, not the licensor, is treated as the sole owner.61
Example 2 would seem troublesome in many of the actual cases
that would exist in the personal goodwill context.  In the situation set
forth in the Example, the self-created marketing intangible is not le-
gally protected as between the C corporation and its shareholder.  In
this situation, because the C corporation (the “licensee” in the context
of Example 2) has control over the use and results of the marketing
intangible and because the shareholder’s legal protection of the mar-
keting intangible vis-à-vis the C corporation is arguably unclear, the
regulations state that the C corporation in this situation shall be con-
sidered the tax owner of the intangible.  The critical elements for this
inquiry are the C corporation’s practical control and knowledge of the
customer list, customers, and business development strategies.  Un-
less shareholders can demonstrate they have legal protection for their
rights in the marketing intangibles vis-à-vis the C corporation, Exam-
ple 2 of the § 482 regulations provides a difficult hurdle to overcome.
However, even if one assumes the unlikely scenario that the Share-
holder in the Example can demonstrate that a marketing intangible
independent of the personal services was created and that this mar-
keting intangible is owned by the Shareholder under the analysis re-
quired by Treas. Reg. § 1.482-4(f)(3), the issue remains whether the
shareholder is entitled to income generated from the intangible.62
This will be determined by the application of Treas. Reg. § 1.482-
4(f)(4), discussed infra, which establishes a separate and distinct re-
quirement in the § 482 regulations.  Its purpose is to prevent a situa-
tion where the tax ownership was determined to be with one related
party and this determination resulted in an “inappropriate all-or-
nothing result[ ]” based solely on the determination of ownership.63
Thus, Treas. Reg. § 1.482-4(f)(4)(i) explicitly reallocates the economic
benefit of an intangible, including a marketing intangible, away from
the legal owner of the intangible by stating that the legal owner must
compensate the affiliate for any enhancement in value attributable to
the affiliate’s participation.
Treas. Reg. § 1.482-1(f)(4)(ii)(C), Example 5 illustrates the applica-
tion of Treas. Reg. § 1.482-4(f)(4) in the context of a hypothetical
61. Id.
62. In many of the personal goodwill cases, taxpayers have attempted to argue that
an intangible is owned by the shareholder and simply assume that meeting this
standard ends the analysis. See Brief of Appellant at Howard v. United States,
No. 10-35768 (9th Cir. Sept. 1, 2010) (“Professional, human, goodwill is that of a
human.  Not an entity.  In Washington, and in all states, professional goodwill is
a personal asset.”).  As more fully discussed below in the text, the existing trans-
fer pricing regulations have explicitly rejected this approach as set forth in the
preamble to the final regulations. See infra p. 24 and note 65.
63. T.D. 9278, 2006-2 C.B. 256, 268.
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closely analogous to the Example.  In this regard, Example 5 posits a
situation where trademarks are registered in the name of the legal
owner/foreign shareholder but the controlled C corporation incurs
costs associated with advertising to promote the foreign-owned trade-
mark in the United States.  The regulatory example explains that the
controlled C corporation’s funding of the advertising and promotion
activities that enhance the value of the foreign shareholder’s sepa-
rately-owned marketing intangible was inconsistent with the registra-
tion of the legal ownership in the created intangible in the legal
owner’s name. Thus, Example 5 makes clear that the affiliated entity
bearing responsibility for the enhancing the value of the owner’s mar-
keting intangible must receive an appropriate arm’s-length return.
The preamble to the regulations further clarifies Example 5 by
stating that it is a longstanding principle under Treas. Reg. §1.482-
4(d)(1) that the Commissioner may consider reasonable alternatives
in its determination of the arm’s length valuation of the controlled
transaction if a realistic alternative would create a greater § 482 allo-
cation.64  The preamble to the final regulations provides that if a re-
lated party’s realistic alternative appears preferable in comparison to
the price associated with the taxpayer’s chosen legal form, the logical
implication is that the taxpayer’s legal arrangement has been priced
incorrectly.65  Furthermore, in determining the appropriate profit
margin for the controlled C corporation when it has enhanced the
value of an affiliate’s marketing intangible, the final regulations incor-
porate the “commensurate with income” test of § 367(d).  When this
test is applied to the controlled C corporation in the Example, the C
corporation must receive an economic benefit commensurate with the
actual benefits associated with the enhancement of value of the mar-
keting intangible.66  Thus, given that the “commensurate with in-
64. See T.D. 9456 (August 4, 2009).
65. See Treas. Reg. §1.482-9(a) (2010); T.D. 9456 (August 4, 2009).  In the 2003 pro-
posed regulations, one of the examples concluded that “[i]f it is not possible to
identify uncontrolled transactions that incorporate a similar range of interrelated
elements and there are nonroutine contributions by each of [the controlled par-
ties], then the most reliable measure of the arm’s-length price . . . may be the
residual profit split method.”  Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.482-4(f)(4)(ii) Ex. 2, 68 Fed.
Reg. 53,448, 53,463 (Sept. 10, 2003).  This endorsement of the residual profit split
method elicited objections from commentators because the examples suggested
that the residual profit split method was the preferred method if it were not pos-
sible to identify uncontrolled transactions with a similar range of interrelated
elements.  In response, the preamble to the temporary regulations indicates that
the Treasury and the IRS did not intend to imply that the residual profit-split
method was the preferred method for cases involving a non-owner contribution.
2006-2 C.B. at 268.  As a result, explicit references to the residual profit-split
method have been replaced in the 2006 temporary regulations and the 2009 final
regulations by a general reference to the best-method rule. See, e.g., Treas. Reg.
§ 1.482-4(f)(4)(ii) Ex. 3 (2010).
66. Treas. Reg. § 1.482-4(f)(2)(i).
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come” test is applicable to this valuation inquiry, the IRS is
authorized to consider the ultimate disposition value of the goodwill to
the subsequent buyer in the Example for purposes of determining
whether the controlled C corporation has received an adequate alloca-
tion of that overall value  attributable to the costs incurred by it that
enhanced the value of the marketing intangible.
The implications of these regulations are significant for the per-
sonal goodwill inquiry.  Even if the Shareholder in the Example were
able to claim that the shareholder owned a marketing intangible, the
economic benefits of this intangible nevertheless would be allocated
away from the shareholder (i.e., away from the legal owner) and to the
C corporation by reason of Treas. Reg. § 1.482-4(f)(4).  This is because
the economic relationship between them demonstrates that the C cor-
poration was the party bearing the risk and expense of funding the
development and enhancement in value of the marketing intangible.
Accordingly, the C corporation is entitled to be compensated for its
contribution toward the creation and enhancement of the value of the
marketing intangible.  Given that the C corporation paid the costs of
the marketing intangible and given the “look-back” aspects of the com-
mensurate with income test, the economic benefit of the enhancement
in the value of the Shareholder’s marketing intangible must be allo-
cated back to the C corporation in the Example.  As a result, in the
context of the Example, it is unlikely that any economic benefit would
remain in the hands of the shareholder due to the requirements of
Treas. Reg. §1.482-4(f)(4).
2. Martin Ice Cream
The principal authority referenced by proponents of the personal
goodwill planning technique is the Tax Court decision in Martin Ice
Cream,67 which involved an analysis of the tax consequences associ-
ated with a distribution of property by a corporation, Martin Ice
Cream, to its shareholder, Arnold Strassberg.  Given the analysis now
required by the regulations promulgated under § 482, the dicta in
Martin Ice Cream that may suggest that the economic value of a
shareholder-level marketing intangible remains entirely allocable to
the shareholder under the case’s facts has doubtful continued validity
for several reasons.
In Martin Ice Cream, the IRS audited Martin Ice Cream’s 1988 cor-
porate tax return and proposed an adjustment on the grounds that
Martin Ice Cream recognized a taxable gain of $1,430,340 on the dis-
tribution of the stock of its subsidiary, Strassberg Ice Cream Distribu-
tion, to Arnold Strassberg as part of a failed § 355 split-off.
Additionally, the IRS alleged that the sale of assets by Arnold Strass-
67. Martin Ice Cream v. Comm’r, 110 T.C. 189 (1998).
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berg to a third party should be attributed to Martin Ice Cream under
the Court Holding doctrine.68
Arnold Strassberg, a high school math teacher who began moon-
lighting soon after the end of World War II by selling ice cream prod-
ucts wholesale to stores in Newark, New Jersey, revolutionized the
way in which ice cream is marketed and sold.  He initially conducted
his activities as a sole proprietor and later organized a corporation
through which he conducted the business.  However, he was forced to
put that corporation through bankruptcy in the late 1960s.
In 1971, his son, Martin Strassberg, followed in his footsteps and
organized Martin Ice Cream to conduct an ice cream distribution busi-
ness.  Martin was the sole shareholder of Martin Ice Cream and con-
ducted its activities on a part-time basis with help from Arnold until
1975, when Martin began working full-time in the business.
In 1974, Mr. Mattus, the founder of Haagen-Dazs, asked Arnold to
market its ice cream products to supermarkets.  Arnold’s work for
Haagen-Dazs revolutionized ice cream marketing and the retail sale of
ice cream products.  He was so good that Mr. Mattus invited him to
become his partner for the expansion of Haagen-Dazs to the West
Coast.  However, Arnold declined the offer and chose to remain with
Martin Ice Cream.  In 1979, Arnold became a 51% owner of Martin Ice
Cream with Martin retaining ownership of the remaining 49% of the
company.
Martin Ice Cream was a distributor of Haagen-Dazs products.
However, with no written distribution agreement with Haagen-Dazs,
all business was conducted on the basis of an oral agreement between
Arnold and Mr. Mattus.  In 1983, Haagen-Dazs was acquired by an-
other company, which changed the business plan for Haagen-Dazs
and decided that all oral distribution agreements with Haagen-Dazs
required termination.  As a result, Haagen-Dazs approached Arnold
about acquiring his relationships with supermarkets.
About this time, Arnold and Martin decided they no longer wished
to work together and took advantage of the discussions with Haagen-
Dazs to restructure their affairs so they could go their separate ways.
To that end, Strassberg Ice Cream Distribution was organized in 1988
as a subsidiary of Martin Ice Cream, and documents were executed
pursuant to which Martin Ice Cream conveyed to Strassberg Ice
Cream Distribution all of its Haagen-Dazs distribution rights.  There-
after, Martin Ice Cream distributed the stock of Strassberg Ice Cream
Distribution to Arnold in redemption of all of his shares of stock in
68. Id. at 211–14.  This refers to the Supreme Court’s holding in Commissioner v.
Court Holding, 324 U.S. 331 (1945), which generally contemplates that the sub-
stance of negotiations will determine tax consequences and that last minute
changes to form and structure for a transaction may not be respected if done
merely to achieve tax planning objectives.
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Martin Ice Cream in a transaction that they intended to constitute a
tax-deferred split-off under § 355.
Following the split-off transaction, Arnold and Strassberg Ice
Cream Distribution closed a transaction in 1988 pursuant to which
Haagen-Dazs purchased from them all of their Haagen-Dazs distribu-
tion rights.  The purchase price was $1,430,340 (following an audit ad-
justment, and disregarding a contingent amount to be paid over
subsequent years).  This amount was the basis for the IRS contention
that Martin Ice Cream recognized a $1,430,340 gain from the split-off
transaction.  The history of the relationship and negotiations with
Haagen-Dazs also supported the IRS contention that the Court Hold-
ing doctrine should be applied to attribute the transaction with
Haagen-Dazs to Martin Ice Cream.
The Tax Court started its analysis by finding that Martin Ice
Cream never owned the personal relationships Arnold had developed
with customers or Haagen-Dazs, which began long before either Mar-
tin Ice Cream or Strassberg Ice Cream Distribution were organized.
The Tax Court reviewed Arnold’s many accomplishments and leader-
ship in the field of ice cream marketing and described the foregoing
personal relationships as “intangible assets.”69  The Tax Court next
found that Arnold retained ownership of the intangible assets, stating
that:
Ownership of these intangible assets cannot be attributed to petitioner [Mar-
tin Ice Cream] because Arnold never entered into a covenant not to compete
with petitioner or any other agreement—not even an employment agree-
ment—by which any of Arnold’s distribution agreements with Mr. Mattus, Ar-
nold’s relationships with the supermarkets, and Arnold’s ice cream
distribution expertise became the property of petitioner.  This Court has long
recognized that personal relationships of a shareholder-employee are not cor-
porate assets when the employee has no employment contract with the corpo-
ration.  Those personal assets are entirely distinct from the intangible
corporate asset of corporate goodwill.70
The Tax Court then concluded that “the sale to Haagen-Dazs of Ar-
nold’s supermarket relationships and distribution rights cannot be at-
tributed to petitioner.”71
The Tax Court then went on to analyze the actual issue presented
by the case, which was the tax consequences to Martin Ice Cream from
the redemption transaction.  The Tax Court quickly concluded that
the redemption transaction did not satisfy the requirements of § 355
because Strassberg Ice Cream Distribution was not engaged in the ac-
tive conduct of a trade or business immediately after the transac-
tion.72  As a result, the redemption transaction was taxable under
69. Martin Ice Cream, 110 T.C. at 206.
70. Id. at 207.
71. Id. at 209.
72. Id. at 217.
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§ 311(b).73  The Tax Court then analyzed the amount of gain that was
required to be recognized from the transaction.  Based on the conclu-
sion that Martin Ice Cream never owned the assets related to Haagen-
Dazs that were later sold by Arnold, the Tax Court concluded that the
value was substantially less than what the IRS had argued.
The Tax Court’s reference to Arnold’s ownership of the intangible
assets appears to be the principal focus of the proponents of the per-
sonal goodwill planning technique.  However, the Tax Court in Martin
Ice Cream did not address the tax consequences to Arnold and Strass-
berg Ice Cream Distribution from their transaction with Haagen-
Dazs.  As a result, the Tax Court in Martin Ice Cream did not conclude
that Arnold owned a capital asset for tax purposes in the form of per-
sonal goodwill, let alone that he sold a capital asset for tax purposes in
the form of personal goodwill.74  It merely concluded that Martin Ice
Cream did not have any intangible assets or goodwill attributable to
Haagen-Dazs or Arnold’s skills and abilities.  As discussed in section
III.B., infra, this does not mean that Arnold owned anything that
should be considered in the nature of transferrable “goodwill,” that is
to say personal goodwill.  The Tax Court in Martin Ice Cream simply
did not go that far.75
In Kennedy v. Commissioner,76 the Tax Court reviewed Martin Ice
Cream and explained its holding in that case in the following manner:
But the Court in Martin Ice Cream Co. had no occasion to address how the
shareholder should be taxed on the payments, inasmuch as the shareholder
had no case before the Court.  Therefore, the Court was not called to opine on
whether the payments should be treated as payments for services or pay-
ments for a capital asset.77
It seems clear from this statement that the Tax Court does not con-
sider Martin Ice Cream as standing for the broad proposition that any
personal goodwill or marketing intangible existing in the hands of Ar-
73. Because Martin Ice Cream elected to be taxed as an S corporation prior to Janu-
ary 1, 1987 (even though the change was not effective until November 1, 1987), it
was subject to the “built-in gains tax” then in effect under § 1374 of the Code with
respect to the redemption transaction. Id. at 229.  As a result, the redemption
transaction was taxable to both Martin Ice Cream and Martin Strassberg (i.e.,
Arnold’s son and the sole shareholder of Martin Ice Cream following the redemp-
tion transaction).
74. See id. at 209–10; Kennedy v. Comm’r, 100 T.C.M. (RIA) 268, 275 (2010) (apply-
ing this limited reading of the holding in Martin Ice Cream).
75. In fact, the Tax Court cited Providence Mill Supply Co., discussed infra, favora-
bly, which was a case that stated personal skills and abilities do not constitute an
item of goodwill that is subject to transfer. See Providence Mill Supply Co. v.
Comm’r, 2 B.T.A. 791 (1925) (the taxpayer in Providence was a corporation trying
to reduce its tax for 1919 and 1920 on the grounds that it acquired goodwill from
its founding shareholder as a contribution to capital).
76. Kennedy, 100 T.C.M. (CCH) at 268.
77. Id. at 275.
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nold constituted a capital asset that could be sold by Arnold for tax
purposes.
It is interesting, perhaps remarkable, that the IRS did not raise
any of the § 482 regulations noted above to make its case in Martin Ice
Cream.  While our discussion focuses on the 2009 regulations, which
antedated Martin Ice Cream, similar concepts existed in the applica-
ble regulations that existed at that time.  In any event, in light of the
current § 482 regulations, if in fact Arnold did hold a marketing intan-
gible, several aspects of the Martin Ice Cream opinion would raise in-
teresting issues under current law.  First, the Tax Court in Martin Ice
Cream made an ultimate finding of fact that the “sole owner” of the
intangible assets, i.e., a marketing intangible, was the shareholder,
Arnold, and not Martin Ice Cream, the controlled corporation.78  This
would be a problematic finding under the § 482 regulations which, as
indicated supra, were promulgated after the years at issue in Martin
Ice Cream.  The controlled corporation, Martin Ice Cream, had practi-
cal access to the marketing intangible and knowledge of how to exploit
it.  The record is also unclear whether the shareholder, Arnold, could
have prevented the controlled corporation, Martin Ice Cream, from us-
ing the customer list and customer contacts after the disposition of the
business.  Given this uncertainty over the legal protection that Arnold
had vis-à-vis the controlled corporation, Treas. Reg. § 1.482-4(f)(3) ar-
guably could require a finding that Martin Ice Cream, not Arnold, was
in fact the sole owner of this marketing intangible.
A second issue with the Tax Court’s reasoning in Martin Ice Cream
relates to the court’s holding that the entire economic benefit of the
intangible asset was allocable to Arnold because Arnold was consid-
ered the sole owner of the intangible.  This “all or nothing approach” is
what the preamble to the final regulations explicitly attempted to
forestall in Treas. Reg. § 1.482-4(f)(4).  Under the analysis now re-
quired under Treas. Reg. § 1.482-4(f)(4), Martin Ice Cream would be
allocated a portion of the “shareholder-owned goodwill” to the extent it
funded the expenditures that enhanced the value of the shareholder’s,
i.e., Arnold’s, marketing intangible.  Furthermore, the economic bene-
fit that is appropriate for Martin Ice Cream to receive is governed by
the “commensurate with income” rules of Treas. Reg. § 1.482-4(f)(2).
Accordingly, the IRS would be able to consider the ultimate disposi-
tional value of the goodwill at the time of its sale in its analysis of
determining what portion of the economic benefits of the shareholder-
owned intangible should have been allocated to Martin Ice Cream and
away from Arnold.  As a result, Martin Ice Cream would not seem to
provide much support for the Shareholder’s proposition in the
Example.
78. See Martin Ice Cream, 110 T.C. at 206.
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Notwithstanding the foregoing, there is one important distinction
between the facts in Martin Ice Cream and those set forth in the Ex-
ample that deserves further consideration.  In this regard, Arnold ar-
guably had a self-created intangible prior to the formation of Martin
Ice Cream given that his customer relationship pre-dated the forma-
tion of the company.  Thus, unlike the case posited in the Example,
Arnold is entitled to receive the economic benefits associated with the
value of this pre-existing intangible since Arnold originally created it.
However, existing case law would indicate that the value of customer
relationships deteriorates over time.  On the facts set forth in Martin
Ice Cream, it appears that Arnold continued to maintain his customer
contacts and business relationships for nine years after he became a
shareholder of Martin Ice Cream.  If Martin Ice Cream bore the en-
tertainment expenses, marketing expenses, and business development
expenses related to these customer contacts for such years and paid
Arnold a salary for his efforts—albeit no employment agreement ex-
isted—then the value of the marketing intangible may be owned by
Martin Ice Cream outright.  Alternatively, such value would at least
need to be bifurcated between the value attributable to the pre-share-
holder customer contacts and the value attributable to the ongoing
customer-related efforts that occurred over the nine years after he be-
came a shareholder.  Cases such as Newark Morning Ledger79 indi-
cate that the value of customer list and customer goodwill deteriorate,
so as of 1988 the value of the marketing intangible in Martin Ice
Cream was likely attributable to the ongoing customer contacts made
over the nine years after Arnold became a shareholder of Martin Ice
Cream, at a time when Martin Ice Cream began funding these expend-
itures.  As a result, very little of the value may be attributable to the
contacts and expenditures made a decade earlier before he became a
shareholder.  If so, then proportionately little of the economic benefit
of the intangibles would be allocated to Arnold as compared to Martin
Ice Cream under Treas. Reg. § 1.482-4(f)(4) even if Arnold were the
sole legal owner of this intangible, which itself is a doubtful conclusion
given the stringent analysis required under Treas. Reg. § 1.482-4(f)(3).
3. Taxpayer Duty of Consistency
In general, advertising and marketing costs are currently deducti-
ble even though they may create valuable marketing intangibles.80
79. Newark Morning Ledger Co. v. United States, 734 F. Supp. 176 (D. N.J. 1990),
rev’d, 945 F.2d 555 (3d Cir. 1991), rev’d, 507 U.S. 546 (1993) (reinstating the
district court decision that ascertained the depreciable life of customer Sunday
subscriptions lists as 14.7 years as to one list and 23.4 years as to a second list).
80. See Denise Coal Co. v. Comm’r, 29 T.C. 528 (1957); Rev. Rul. 92-80, 1992-2 C.B.
57 (“The INDOPCO decision does not affect the treatment of advertising costs
under § 162(a) of the Code. These costs are generally deductible under that sec-
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Similarly, taxpayers generally are able to currently deduct pre-operat-
ing expenditures that create or improve the “going concern value” of
an enterprise.81  Taxpayers have also achieved success in deducting
costs associated with expanding an existing business.82  Congress has
considered requiring capitalization of these costs that result in self-
created intangibles, but it has never moved forward with those reform
proposals.83  In addition, even after the broadly worded opinion in In-
dopco, Inc. v. Commissioner,84 the IRS has continued to accept that
marketing costs generally need not be capitalized even though they
may create or enhance the intangible assets of the corporation.85
tion even though advertising may have some future effect on business activities,
as in the case of institutional or goodwill advertising”); Rev. Rul. 68-561, 1968-2
C.B. 117.
81. See I.R.C. § 195 (2006); see also S. REP. NO. 96-1036, at 12 (1980) (“In the case of
an existing business, eligible startup expenditures do not include deductible ordi-
nary and necessary business expenses paid or incurred in connection with an
expansion of the business.  As under present law, these expenses will continue to
be currently deductible.”).
82. See, e.g., Briarcliff Candy Corp. v. Comm’r, 475 F.2d 775 (2d Cir. 1973); NCNB
Corp. v. United States, 684 F.2d 285 (4th Cir. 1982); Cent. Texas Savings & Loan
Ass’n v. Comm’r, 731 F.2d 1181 (5th Cir. 1984); Iowa-Des Moines Nat’l Bank v.
Comm’r, 592 F.2d 433 (8th Cir. 1979); Colorado Springs Nat’l Bank v. United
States, 505 F.2d 1185 (10th Cir. 1974); First Sec. Bank v. Comm’r, 334 F.2d 120
(9th Cir. 1979).
83. Compare H.R. REP. NO. 103-111, at 760 (1993) (legislative history to § 197 simply
states that “[i]t is also believed that there is no need at this time to change the
Federal income tax treatment of self-created intangible assets, such as goodwill
that is created through advertising and other similar expenditures”), with STAFF
OF J. COMM. ON TAX’N, 104TH CONG., IMPACT ON SMALL BUSINESS OF REPLACING
THE FED. INCOME TAX 83 (J. Comm. Print 1996),  http://www.jct.gov/publications.
html?func=startdown&id=2183 (Capitalizing and then amortizing 20% of adver-
tising costs was estimated to increase tax revenues by $37.9 billion in 1987), and
Tax Analysts, Revenue Options Book Released but Is It a Best Seller?, TAX NOTES
TODAY, June 29, 1987, available at LEXIS, 87 TNT 125-1, and Alexander Polin-
sky, Amortizing Advertising Expenses: Not in the Foreseeable Future, TAX NOTES
TODAY, Sept. 27, 1993, available at LEXIS, 93 TNT 199–2. (“revenues would in-
crease by more than $18 billion over five years in 1993”).  The pressure of group
opposition to capitalization of advertising costs is even more substantial. See Po-
linsky, supra; Barbara Kirchheimer, Proposal to Capitalize Advertising Expenses
Draws Fire at W&M Revenue Hearing, TAX NOTES TODAY, Sept. 5, 1993, available
at LEXIS 93 TNT 187–1; STAFF OF J. COMM. ON TAX’N, 103d CONG., DESCRIPTION
OF MISC. REVENUE PROPOSALS SCHEDULED FOR A HEARING BEFORE THE SUBCOMM.
ON SELECT REVENUE MEASURES OF THE H. COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS ON SEPT. 8,
21, AND 23, 1993 AND THE H. COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS ON SEPT. 9, 1993, Propo-
sal II.B.3, (J. Comm. Print 1993), reprinted in TAX NOTES TODAY, Sept. 20, 1993.
84. Indopco, Inc. v. Comm’r, 503 U.S. 79 (1992).
85. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 2000-4, 2000-1 C.B. 3314 (costs to obtain ISO 9000 certifica-
tion currently deductible notwithstanding decision in Indopco); Rev. Rul. 96-62,
1996-2 C.B. 9 (employee training costs deductible notwithstanding decision in In-
dopco); Rev. Rul. 92-80, 1992-2 C.B.57 (advertising costs currently deductible not-
withstanding decision in Indopco).
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Given these rules, it is likely that the development and customer
related costs in the Example would have been deducted on the C cor-
poration’s tax return as ordinary and necessary business expenses di-
rectly related to the business of the C corporation.  In order to claim
that these expenditures were ordinary and necessary business ex-
penses under § 162, the implicit representation is that these expenses
were directly incurred for the benefit of the C corporation and were
not for the benefit of the shareholder.86  Thus, the C corporation has
taken a position with respect to the fact that the C corporation is the
direct beneficiary of the expenditures incurred in the Example.
Furthermore, by not reporting income in the amount of the in-
crease in value of the marketing intangible in prior years when the
development and customer related costs were incurred, the Share-
holder in like manner has also made a prior representation that the
Shareholder was not the recipient of any intangible value creation in
the earlier tax periods.  In this regard, if the marketing expenses are
borne by the C corporation and the results of these marketing and
customer development expenditures creates a separate marketing in-
tangible that is owned by the related-party shareholder, then Treas.
Reg. § 1.482-4(d)(4)(i) provides that the owner of the separately cre-
ated marketing intangible must compensate the affiliate for this mar-
keting intangible on an arm’s length basis.  Because the costs
associated with creating the marketing intangible must be reimbursed
when created for the benefit of an affiliate, the deduction in full for
such costs on the C corporation’s tax return without reimbursement
by the shareholder could constitute a representation of fact that the C
corporation was the direct beneficiary of this expenditure and also a
representation of law that no marketing intangible of any significant
value was created for the benefit of the related party shareholder.  The
implications are significant.  To the extent that the deductions in the
Example were taken in full on the prior year tax returns of the C
corporations and no separate payment by the shareholder was re-
ported by the shareholder on the shareholder’s tax return for the
value creation of the marketing intangible in prior years, such a prior
tax position by the shareholder is now inconsistent with a shareholder
assertion in the later tax year that the resulting marketing intangible
is now significant and is in fact separately owned by the shareholder
and not the controlled C corporation.  By not reporting income on the
shareholder tax return as and when the marketing intangible was be-
ing created via expenses incurred by the C corporation, the share-
holder’s assertion that it was the beneficiary of these expenditures all
along seems inconsistent with the earlier tax positions taken on the
shareholder’s tax returns in prior years.
86. Treas. Reg. § 1.162-1(a) (as amended in 1993); Treas. Reg. § 1.162-2(b)(1) (1960);
Treas. Reg. § 1.274-2(c)(3)(i) (as amended in 1996).
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The “duty of consistency doctrine” is a judicially created doctrine
that prevents a taxpayer from taking advantage of a past misrepre-
sentation in a year now closed by thereafter changing positions and
thus avoiding a present tax on the grounds that more tax should have
been paid in the prior year.87  When this situation arises, “the Com-
missioner may act as if the previous representation, on which he re-
lied, continued to be true, even if it is not.  The taxpayer is estopped to
assert the contrary.”88  The rule’s purpose is to “preclude parties from
playing fast and loose with the courts” by taking a position in a given
tax year and then taking a contrary position once the statute of limita-
tions has run on that taxable year.89
In McMillan v. United States,90 the District Court attempted to
distill the taxpayer’s duty of consistency doctrine into three elements:
(1) the taxpayer made a representation of fact or reported an item for
tax purposes in one year;91 (2) the IRS acquiesced in or relied upon
that fact for that year,92 and (3) the taxpayer desires to change the
representation, previously made, in a later tax year after the first year
has been closed.93  This articulation was endorsed by Beltzer v. United
States94 and has since been widely endorsed.95
In the cases set forth that have ruled against the taxpayer in sec-
tion III.B., infra, the facts appear to have been that the controlled C
corporation bore the ongoing costs associated with business develop-
ment, client contact, marketing, and research and development ex-
penditures.  Having so deducted these costs as a corporate-level
expenditure without reimbursement by the shareholder, it is inconsis-
tent to then claim that the results of these expenditures are owned by
the shareholder and not by the corporation.  Such an assertion is in-
consistent with the deductions taken on the C corporation tax return
87. Lewis v. Comm’r, 18 F.3d 20, 26 (1st Cir. 1994) (citing Beltzer v. United States,
495 F.2d 211, 212–13 (8th Cir. 1974)); S. Pac. Transp. Co. v. Comm’r, 75 T.C. 497,
559–61 (1980).
88. Eagan v. United States, 80 F.3d 13, 17 (1st Cir. 1996) (quoting Herrington v.
Comm’r, 854 F.2d 755, 758 (5th Cir. 1988)).
89. Estate of Ashman v. Comm’r, 231 F.3d 541, 543 (9th Cir. 2000) (quoting Russell
v. Rolfs, 893 F.2d 1033, 1037 (9th Cir. 1990)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
90. McMillan v. United States, No. 2769, 1964 WL 12375 (S.D. W. Va. 1964).
91. Id. at *2.  Courts have relied upon the doctrine when the earlier year is closed,
the earlier year was agreed between the IRS and the taxpayer, or an inconsis-
tency exists between beneficiaries and estates. See generally, BORIS I. BITTKER,
MARTIN J. MCMAHON. JR. & LAWRENCE A. ZELENAK, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION
OF INDIVIDUALS ¶51.09 (3d ed. 2011).
92. McMillan, 1964 WL 12375, at *2.  Case law indicates that the IRS’s acceptance of
a filed tax return is sufficient to satisfy this element of the duty of consistency
doctrine. See Arberg v. Comm’r, 94 T.C.M. (CCH) 215 (T.C. 2007) (citing cases).
93. McMillan, 1964 WL 12375, at *2.
94. Beltzer v. United States, 495 F.2d 211 (8th Cir. 1974).
95. See Steve R. Johnson, The Taxpayer’s Duty of Consistency, 46 TAX. L. REV. 537
(1991).
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in prior years.  Accordingly, the shareholder should be prevented
under the duty of consistency doctrine from claiming that share-
holder-level personal goodwill now exists and is owned by the share-
holder when the prior tax returns demonstrate the opposite assertion
in prior periods.  To date, none of the cases that address the existence
of shareholder personal goodwill cite the duty of consistency doctrine,
but the Ninth Circuit in Howard v. United States96 uses language that
is consistent with the duty of consistency doctrine as indicated in the
following excerpt:
Finally, the Taxpayers concede that Dr. Howard chose to conduct his business
as a C corporation to take advantage of tax benefits that accrued to him over
the years.  As one of the members of the panel aptly observed at oral argu-
ment, “so having then made himself available to the advantages of using the
corporation, and having entered into the agreements that he did with the cor-
poration, then why should we try then to allow him . . . out of what he got
himself into.”97
The above statement, albeit not citing the duty of consistency doctrine
line of cases, is consistent with the case law that holds that the share-
holder should have significant equitable constraints in claiming the
existence of shareholder-level personal goodwill if in fact in prior
years the ongoing customer-related expenses that created the positive
business reputation, i.e., the marketing intangible, were borne en-
tirely by the controlled C corporation and deducted on its prior year’s
tax returns as ordinary and necessary business expenses of the con-
trolled C corporation.
In the situation posited in the Example, the controlled C corpora-
tion’s deduction of the ongoing marketing and business development
expenses in full constitutes a representation that no significant mar-
keting intangible owned by the shareholder was created.  Otherwise,
the shareholder should have reimbursed the controlled C corporation
for the benefit of this intangible on an ongoing basis in an amount
equal to the value of this enhancement using the commensurate with
income standards of existing transfer pricing regulations.98  By de-
ducting these customer-contact expenses on the controlled C corpora-
tion’s tax return without reimbursement—whether advertising,
marketing, business development, and research and development ex-
penditures—the C corporation and Shareholder in the Example have
made a prior representation that they now seek to disavow in order to
obtain a significant tax benefit at the time of the disposition of the
self-created intangible.  In this situation, even if the taxpayer’s latter
assertion were factually true, the duty of consistency doctrine would
96. Howard v. United States, 448 F. App’x 752 (9th Cir. 2011).
97. Id. at 754–55 (alteration in original) (quoting Audio Recording of Oral Argument,
id.).
98. Treas. Reg. § 1.482-4(f)(2) (1994); Treas. Reg. § 1.482-4(f)(4) (1994).
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estop the shareholder from claiming that it is entitled to the benefit of
this marketing intangible.
An argument might be made that the duty of consistency doctrine
does not extend to issues involving goodwill or going concern value.
This argument would be based on the subsequent administrative con-
cessions made by the IRS after its victory in Hillsboro National Bank
v. Commissioner.99
In Hillsboro, the Supreme Court held that the tax benefit rule was
implicated to create a corporate-level tax when previously deducted
inventory was distributed to its shareholders.100  In this situation, the
Court stated that the General Utilities doctrine would not shelter the
corporate-level tax on a distribution of previously expensed inventory
because the distribution of such expensed inventory was fundamen-
tally inconsistent with the allowance of the prior deduction.101  In dis-
sent, Justice Stevens questioned the Supreme Court’s application of
the tax benefit rule in the fact pattern presented in Hillsboro by posit-
ing the following hypothetical:
It is not clear, however, how the Court would react to other expenses that
provide an enduring benefit.  I find no limiting principle in the Court’s opinion
that distinguishes cattle feed . . . from prepaid rent, prepaid insurance, accru-
als of employee vacation time, advertising, management training, or any other
expense that will have made the going concern more valuable . . . . 102
The logic of Justice Stevens’s argument called into question whether
and to what extent the General Utilities doctrine might apply to distri-
butions that involved self-created intangibles and whether the affirm-
ative use of the General Utilities doctrine might create a recapture
item to the distributing corporation.  Congress largely endorsed Jus-
tice Stevens’s consistency argument when it repealed the General
Utilities doctrine outright in the 1986 Act.103  However, as to whether
the subsequent disposition of self-created intangibles creates an ordi-
nary income recapture item, the IRS allayed concerns about the ordi-
nary versus capital implications of the Hillsboro decision by issuing
Rev. Rul. 85-186.104  In this ruling, the IRS stated that deductions
claimed for research and development costs pursuant to § 174(a) need
not be recaptured as ordinary income under the tax benefit rule upon
the subsequent sale of the self-created intangible.105  This ruling pro-
vided authority for the proposition that the prior deduction of such
costs was not a “fundamentally inconsistent event” that would require
99. Hillsboro Nat’l Bank v. Comm’r, 460 U.S. 370 (1983).
100. Id. at 402.
101. Id. at 397–98.
102. Id. at 419.
103. For a discussion of the repeal of the General Utilities doctrine, see supra notes
10–15 and accompanying text.
104. Rev. Rul. 85-186, 1985-2 C.B. 84.
105. Id.
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recapture once the self-created intangible was subsequently disposed.
The scope of this administrative concession is debatable.  Respected
commentators have called for the gain on disposition of goodwill to be
treated as ordinary income.106
Importantly, unlike the fact pattern set forth in the Example,
Rev. Rul. 85-186 dealt only with a potential character inconsistency.
Rev. Rul. 85-186 did not posit a situation where one taxpayer incurred
the expense associated with creating the intangible and a different
taxpayer attempted to claim the self-created intangible’s economic
rights.  Although Rev. Rul. 85-186 indicates that the IRS will ignore
potential character inconsistencies, it does not mean that the IRS
would be oblivious to inconsistencies that go to the fundamental ques-
tion of which party benefitted from the cost that created the intangi-
ble.  To the extent that the C corporation in the Example claimed
marketing, advertising, and research and development expenditures
as a business deduction, it is inconsistent to state that this was in fact
related to the creation of an intangible attributable to these expendi-
tures that is owned at the shareholder level, and Rev. Rul. 85-186 does
not speak to an inconsistency of this nature.  As a result, the better
view is that Rev. Rul. 85-186 should not have any bearing on the fact
pattern set forth in the Example, and thus the inconsistency issue
contained in the Example should be resolved under the legal stan-
dards set forth by Beltzer and other cases involving the duty of consis-
tency doctrine.
B. Residual Goodwill Resides With the Business
It is undisputed that the personal ability and aptitude of an indi-
vidual belongs to the individual.  For example, the Tax Court in Mac-
Donald v. Commissioner107 stated that it found “no authority which
holds that an individual’s personal ability is part of the assets of a
corporation by which he is employed where, as in the instant cases,
the corporation does not have a right by contract or otherwise to the
future services of that individual.”108  The Tax Court in Norwalk v.
106. Calvin H. Johnson, Sale of Goodwill and Other Intangibles as Ordinary Income,
TAX NOTES TODAY, January 15, 2008, available at LEXIS, 2008 TNT 10-31.
107. MacDonald v. Comm’r, 3 T.C. 720 (1944).  The taxpayer in MacDonald was the
sole owner of a corporation that conducted an insurance brokerage business.  The
taxpayer liquidated the corporation at a time when the value of its tangible as-
sets was less than the liabilities assumed by the taxpayer from the liquidation.
The taxpayer reported no gain from the liquidation.  The IRS argued that the
corporation had valuable goodwill at the time of liquidation and assessed a gain
from the transaction.  The Tax Court found that the corporation had no goodwill
at the time of liquidation and held in favor of the taxpayer. Id. at 730.
108. Id. at 727; see also Cullen v. Comm’r 14 T.C. 368 (1950) (The taxpayer in Cullen
was one of four equal shareholders who owned a corporation engaged in the busi-
ness of selling orthopedic devices and artificial limbs; the taxpayer bought out the
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Commissioner,109 references this part of the analysis in MacDonald
when concluding that the liquidation of a C corporation engaged in the
business of delivering accounting services did not involve a transfer of
goodwill to its shareholders in light of the absence of employment or
covenant-not-to-compete agreements applicable to the sharehold-
ers.110  The IRS asserted that the customer list held by the C corpora-
tion represented a separate and distinct asset that created a
corporate-level gain at the time of the liquidation.  After citing Mac-
Donald and Providence Mill Supply Co., discussed infra, among other
cases, the Tax Court held that the C corporation did not realize any
gain because no goodwill existed at the corporate level.  The court
based its holding on its finding that no transferrable “customer-based
intangible” existed that was independent of the abilities, skills, and
reputation of the individual accountants.  As a result, there simply
was no goodwill.
However, the fact that such personal attributes are retained and
could have contributed to the creation of goodwill of the corporate em-
ployer, had appropriate contractual or other rights existed, does not
mean that they constitute transferable goodwill in the hands of the
individual for tax purposes.  The first expression of this premise gen-
erally is attributed to the Board of Tax Appeals’ opinion in Providence
Mill Supply Co. v. Commissioner111 where the court stated that
“[a]bility, skill, experience, acquaintanceship, or other personal char-
acteristics or qualifications do not constitute good will as an item of
property; nor do they exist in such form that they could be the subject
other three shareholders and immediately thereafter liquidated the corporation.
The purchase price paid by the taxpayer was in excess of the book value of the
corporation’s assets.  The taxpayer claimed a loss from the liquidation on those
grounds.  The IRS argued that the purchase price indicated that the corporation
had value in excess of the book value of its assets—i.e., goodwill—and assessed a
gain with respect to the 25% of the corporation previously owned by the taxpayer.
The Tax Court concluded that the corporation had no goodwill and found that the
taxpayer recognized neither gain nor loss from the liquidation.); Taracido v.
Comm’r, 72 T.C. 1014 (1979) (corporation engaged in insurance brokerage busi-
ness claimed that settlement proceeds from a lawsuit against insurance company
were not taxable on the grounds that it was in consideration for destruction, in
part, of corporation’s goodwill; the Tax Court found that the corporation did not
have any goodwill and thus did not reach the merits of the taxpayer’s technical
argument).
109. Norwalk v. Comm’r, 76 T.C.M. 208 (1998).
110. Id.
111. Providence Mill Supply Co. v. Comm’r, 2 B.T.A. 791 (1925).  The taxpayer in
Providence was a corporation trying to reduce its tax for 1919 and 1920 on the
grounds that it acquired goodwill from its founding shareholder as a contribution
to capital.  Thus, it could be included as part of “invested capital,” which appar-
ently gave it some advantage under the tax law applicable at the time.
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of transfer.”112  Similarly, the Tax Court in MacDonald v. Commis-
sioner113 quoted with approval its statement in Wickes Boiler Co. v.
Commissioner that “the ability, will, experience, or other qualifica-
tions of individuals do not constitute good will as an item of
property.”114
For an individual’s personal aptitude to create an asset that can be
sold, the asset must be transferrable independent of the personal rep-
utation of the individual.115  When an individual’s customer relation-
ships create residual goodwill and not a separate and distinct
marketing intangible, the courts have concluded that the residual
goodwill is associated with the business and is inseparable from the
underlying business assets.  For example, in Horton v. Commis-
sioner,116 Mr. Horton entered into a contract to sell his accounting
practice, which was then operated as a sole proprietorship, to another
accounting firm.  At that time, Mr. Horton had several employees
working for him.  The buyer agreed to pay Mr. Horton: (a) $2,500 at
closing, which the Tax Court found was in exchange for the tangible
assets used in the accounting practice; (b) $416.66 each month for the
last three months of 1941, which the Tax Court found was in exchange
for the personal services contemplated in the contract; and (c) 10% of
all fees collected by the buyer from Mr. Horton’s office location for five
years and 15% for certain audit engagements for governmental agen-
cies.117  This last category of payment was the subject of the case.
Mr. Horton reported all amounts received from the third category
as received from the sale of goodwill, and thus reported long-term cap-
ital gain from that component of the transaction.  The IRS audited Mr.
Horton’s tax returns for 1942 and 1943, and took the position that all
amounts received by Mr. Horton from the third category of payments
should be allocated to a covenant not to compete that the parties en-
112. Id. at 793 (emphasis added).  Additionally, the Board of Tax Appeals in Sommers
v. Comm’r, 22 B.T.A. 1241 (1931), quoted with approval its statement of analysis
in Braunwarth v. Comm’r, 22 B.T.A. 1008 (1931), to the effect that “[i]t may be
conceded that the petitioner had built up a considerable clientele and business
acquaintanceship, and that this clientele followed him to a large extent, during
his various enterprises. But this personal following does not constitute good will
within the generally accepted meaning of the term.” Sommers, 22 B.T.A. at 1244
(alteration in original) (emphasis added) (quoting Braunwarth, 22 B.T.A. at
1023).
113. MacDonald v. Comm’r, 3 T.C. 720 (1944).
114. MacDonald, 3 T.C. at 727 (emphasis added) (quoting Wickes Boiler Co. v.
Comm’r, 15 B.T.A. 1118, 1122 (1929) (internal quotation marks omitted).
115. This statement of the law, which was articulated in cases such as Providence Mill
Supply Co. and MacDonald, is now explicitly stated in Treas. Reg. § 1.482-4(b)
(“[A]n intangible is an asset that comprises any of the following items and has
substantial value independent of the services of any individual.”).
116. Horton v. Comm’r, 13 T.C. 143 (1949).
117. Id. at 148.
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tered into as part of the transaction (and thus taxable as ordinary
income).118
The Tax Court found that 50% of the amounts from the third cate-
gory were attributable to the goodwill and 50% were attributable to
the covenant not to compete.119  In the end, it appears that the Tax
Court may have simply adopted the fifty-fifty approach as a compro-
mise to resolve the case.  Nonetheless, the discussion does take into
account the fact that Mr. Horton sold goodwill to the buyer, and this
conclusion allowed him to recognize some capital gain with respect to
the sale.  However, it was only because he was conducting the busi-
ness as a sole proprietor and thus by necessity was the owner of the
overall business that he was the seller of the goodwill and other busi-
ness assets.
Similarly, in Watson v. Commissioner,120 Mr. Watson entered into
a contract to sell his accounting practice—conducted as a sole proprie-
torship—to two accountants who were going into practice together.
The sale was staged over a ten-year period.  The purchase price for the
first stage was payable in installments.  Mr. Watson took the position
that the gain he recognized from receipt of the first installment was
long-term capital gain from the disposition of goodwill associated with
his accounting practice.  The IRS asserted that it was ordinary income
from the assignment of future earnings.  The Tax Court cited Provi-
dence Mill Supply Co.121 for the standard that a person’s ability, skill,
experience, acquaintanceship, and other personal characteristics and
qualifications are not part of goodwill that can be conveyed to another
person.122  The Tax Court further said that the “position that personal
characteristics or qualifications do not constitute goodwill as an item
of property as may be the subject of transfer is consonant with our
views on the subject.”123  The Tax Court concluded that residual good-
will associated with the business did exist.  However, as in the Horton
case, the residual goodwill was sold as part of the entire business, in-
cluding all of the business assets, by the sole proprietor.  As a result,
the Tax Court supported Mr. Watson’s position.
118. Id. at 148.  The parties entered into the covenant-not-to-compete in order to pro-
tect the buyer against Mr. Horton using his accounting firm’s name after the
closing and thereby harming the goodwill that the buyer had bargained to ac-
quire as part of the transaction.
119. Id. at 149. See also Wyler v. Comm’r, 14 T.C. 1251 (1950) (upholding the alloca-
tion to goodwill where Wyler sold an accounting practice to Peat Marwick, Mitch-
ell & Co. and reported goodwill on the sale, but like Horton, the seller of the
goodwill was selling the entire business assets to which the goodwill was insepa-
rable from).
120. Watson v. Comm’r, 35 T.C. 203 (1960).
121. Providence Mill Supply Co. v. Comm’r, 2 B.T.A. 791 (1925).
122. Watson, 35 T.C. at 210.
123. Id.
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In Howard v. United States,124 which is the most recent case in
this area, Dr. Howard practiced dentistry for many years as a sole
proprietor until 1980, at which time he transferred his dental practice
to a corporation, the Howard Corporation.125  Also in 1980, Dr. How-
ard entered into an employment agreement and a covenant-not-to-
compete with the Howard Corporation.  In 2002, Dr. Howard and the
Howard Corporation sold the dental practice to another dentist and
that dentist’s own corporation.  The transaction was structured so
that nearly 90% of the sales proceeds were allocated to Dr. Howard’s
personal goodwill, and as a result Dr. Howard reported $320,358 of
long-term capital gain from the transaction.  The balance of the
purchase price was allocated to the Howard Corporation in exchange
for assets.
The IRS recharacterized the transaction as a sale of goodwill by
the Howard Corporation and treated Dr. Howard as having received a
dividend distribution from the Howard Corporation in the amount of
$320,358.  The District Court found that, because Dr. Howard was
prohibited by the employment and covenant-not-to-compete agree-
ments from entering into a competitive dental practice with Howard
Corporation, any goodwill generated during the term of the agreement
belonged to the Howard Corporation.  Furthermore, the District Court
indicated that this conclusion was further supported by the fact that
all income from the dental practice was reported by Howard Corpora-
tion.   Accordingly, the District Court ruled in favor of the IRS.126
The Ninth Circuit affirmed the District Court’s decision in How-
ard, stating that any goodwill created by the personal services of Dr.
Howard was owned by the Howard Corporation which had paid for all
of Dr. Howard’s operating expenses for three years.127  The Ninth Cir-
cuit focused on the terms and conditions of the employment and cove-
nant-not-to-compete agreements between Dr. Howard and the
Howard Corporation.  However, given the broad authority for the IRS
to impute the existence of an employment agreement under Treas.
Reg. § 1.482-1(d)(3)(ii)(B)(1) when the controlled C corporation fully
funded the creation of the self-created intangible, it would be difficult
to believe that the existence or non-existence of a formal employment
agreement, or a formal covenant-not-to-compete, should have made
any practical difference to the Ninth Circuit.128  Furthermore, in this
regard, the Ninth Circuit observed in reaching its conclusion that Dr.
124. Howard v. United States, No. CV–08–365–RMP, 2010 WL 3061626 (E.D. Wash.
Jul. 30, 2010), aff’d, Howard v. United States, 448 F. App’x 752 (9th Cir. 2011).
125. Id. at *1.
126. Id. at *6.
127. Howard, 2011 WL 3796723, at *755.
128. The facts in Howard  included a related-party situation to which I.R.C. § 482
clearly applies, as also is true with respect to the fact pattern set forth in The
Example. See supra notes 58–66 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
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Howard chose to conduct his dental practice through the Howard Cor-
poration in order to take advantage of tax benefits that accrued to him
over the years.  After citing comments made by one of the Ninth Cir-
cuit panel members during oral argument, the Ninth Circuit indicated
that it would not be appropriate to allow Dr. Howard to circumvent
the consequences of that structure through this dispositional planning
technique.129
In Kennedy v. Commissioner,130 another recent case in this area,
James Kennedy was an employee benefits consultant who began
working as a sole proprietor in 1990 and then in 1995 transferred his
practice to a newly organized controlled C corporation named KCG
International, Inc. (KCG) in 1995.  Mr. Kennedy did not have an em-
ployment agreement or covenant-not-to-compete with KCG.131  KCG
had one other employee in addition to Mr. Kennedy.
During 2000, Mr. Kennedy was approached by Mack & Parker, Inc.
(Mack) about the opportunity for Mack to acquire Mr. Kennedy’s busi-
ness.  The transaction closed on October 31, 2000, and was effectuated
with three interrelated contracts: (1) an Agreement for Assignment of
Know-How and Goodwill; (2) an Asset Purchase Agreement; and (3) a
Consulting Agreement.  The goodwill agreement provided that Mr.
Kennedy (a) conveyed his special personal relationships with 46 cli-
ents set forth on a list attached to the agreement, as well as his per-
sonal goodwill incident to such relationships, (b) conveyed his know-
how with respect to the business, and (c) would not engage in the em-
ployee benefits consulting business—except for working with Mack—
through 2007.  In exchange for such agreements, Mack agreed to pay
Kennedy the sum of $176,100 on January 2, 2001, and to make five
annual payments from 2002–2006, the amounts of which were deter-
mined by formula based on collections from KCG’s clients.  The trans-
action was structured in the foregoing manner based on tax advice
received by Mr. Kennedy toward the end of his negotiation with Mack.
On their tax return for 2001, Mr. and Mrs. Kennedy reported the
$176,100 as proceeds from the sale of goodwill and intangibles,
thereby generating gain from the sale of a long-term capital asset.
Similarly, on their tax return for 2002, Mr. and Mrs. Kennedy re-
ported the $32,757.94 that they received from Mack during 2002
under the goodwill agreement as proceeds from the sale of goodwill
and intangibles, thereby generating gain from the sale of a long-term
broad re-characterization authority provided to the IRS under the final I.R.C.
§ 482 regulations.
129. Howard, 2011 WL 3796723, at *755.
130. Kennedy v. Comm’r, 100 T.C.M. (CCH) 268 (T.C. 2010).
131. This is in contrast to Dr. Howard, who had both types of agreements with the
Howard Corporation. Howard, 2010 WL 3061626, at *3.
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capital asset.  The IRS recharacterized all of these amounts as ordi-
nary income.
The Tax Court held, based on the facts and circumstances in this
case, that “the payments to Kennedy were consideration for services
rather than goodwill.”132  In this regard, the Tax Court said:
Here, however, the allocation of 75 percent of the total consideration paid by
Mack & Parker to goodwill was a tax-motivated afterthought that occurred
late in the negotiations . . . the decision to allocate 75 percent of the total
payments to goodwill appears not to be grounded in any business reality.  It
did not reflect the value of goodwill in relation to the other valuable aspects of
the transaction, such as the services to be performed by Kennedy for Mack &
Parker.  Rather the 75 percent allocation was driven by a desire to minimize
taxes.133
As a result, the Tax Court determined that “the payments Kennedy
received were not payments for goodwill,” and that they “are includ-
able in ordinary income.”134
The above authorities involve factual determinations that are par-
ticular to the facts and circumstances before the court.  However, they
can be synthesized as follows:
1. Personal ability and relationships, by themselves, do not consti-
tute goodwill. If the Shareholder in the Example is paid for the
Shareholder’s personal ability and relationships as was the case
in Kennedy and Norwalk, then that payment represents ordi-
nary compensation income to the shareholder, not a payment in
exchange for personal goodwill.  Such payments could be made
pursuant to employment, consulting, or covenant-not-to-com-
pete arrangements.135  Because these agreements generate or-
dinary income to the selling shareholder, they are not as
advantageous for selling shareholders as a sale of personal
goodwill purports to be, since, if it were viable, such a sale
would generate capital gain.  However, when respected,
amounts paid under such arrangements generate taxable in-
come only at the shareholder level and in that sense provide an
alternative means to avoid the corporate-level tax.  If the
amounts paid were unreasonable considering the entirety of the
132. Kennedy, 100 T.C.M (CCH) at 274.
133. Id.
134. Id.  For a similar result, see also Solomon v. Comm’r, 95 T.C.M. (CCH) 1389
(2008) (taxpayer allocated sales price to customer list/goodwill; the Tax Court
held that the proceeds should entirely be allocated to the shareholder’s cove-
nants-not-to-compete and taxed at ordinary income rates because the court did
not believe a separately created marketing intangible existed).
135. Employment, consulting, and covenant-not-to-compete arrangements are a tradi-
tional part of dispositional tax planning, including for circumstances such as
those present in the Example. See Michael Schlesinger, Covenants Not to Com-
pete Are Still Useful After RRA ’93, 51 TAX’N FOR ACCT 204 (1993); Bruch A. Rich,
Handling Covenant Not to Compete Negotiations to Assure Tax Benefits and Pre-
clude Challenges, 24 TAX’N FOR ACCT 354 (1980).
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circumstances, then the amounts paid are simply disguised con-
sideration for something else, such as the goodwill of the under-
lying C corporation.136  The IRS has issued guidelines for
auditing amounts allocated to covenant-not-to-compete, employ-
ment and consulting arrangements that require such arrange-
ments to comport with economic reality for this very reason.137
2. If the Shareholder’s personal services in the Example create
residual goodwill for the underlying business, then that residual
goodwill is attributable to the business and can only be sold as
part of the business assets.  When those business assets are
owned as a sole proprietorship as in Horton and Watson, then
the goodwill is sold with the overall assets by the sole proprietor
and can generate long-term capital gain for the proprietor.
However, when the business assets are owned by the proprie-
tor’s C corporation as was the case in Howard, then the residual
goodwill is inseparable from those assets and is owned by the
controlled C corporation.
3. If a separate and distinct intangible exists that can be segre-
gated from the operating business assets, then that separate
and distinct asset is subject to the allocation rules of § 482 as a
marketing intangible.
Importantly, what is not contemplated in either existing case law
or the § 482 regulations is the idea that there can be goodwill that is
an asset separate and distinct from the underlying operating business
assets and yet is not subject to § 482’s transfer pricing allocation rules
that apply to intangibles.  If a separate and distinct intangible exists
in the context of a related party shareholder and controlled corpora-
tion context, then Treas. Reg. § 1.482-4 applies to that arrangement
and tax planning premised on its non-applicability is highly
questionable.
IV. CORPORATE TAX REFORM IMPLICATIONS
The judicial doctrines of business purpose, device, and step trans-
action grew out of an era when the courts were attempting to defend
the corporate tax base against efforts that would eliminate corporate-
136. See Balthorpe v. Comm’r, 356 F.2d 28 (5th Cir. 1966).
137. See ISP Settlement Guideline Explores Amortization of Employment Contracts,
TAX NOTES TODAY, Oct. 24, 1997, available at LEXIS 97 TNT 206-25; Revised ISP
Paper Examines Covenants Not To Compete, TAX NOTES TODAY, Feb. 19, 1996,
available at LEXIS 96 TNT 49-25.  The adversity of interest between the buyer
and the seller in these instances may not be strong enough to appropriately de-
fend against attempts to circumvent the repeal of the General Utilities doctrine,
and so further legislation or regulatory guidance may be needed with respect to
these arrangements.  Such issues are worthy of further study but are beyond the
scope of this paper.
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level taxation.  But even with these protections, the fact remains that
the ability of taxpayers to choose whether or not to conduct business
activity in pass-through entities challenges the efficacy of a corporate
income tax regime.138  Several commentators have seen this trend of
disincorporation of domestic business activity and have called on Con-
gress to enact a business-entity tax that applies regardless of the tax
classification of the particular business entity, whether C corporation,
S corporation, partnership, or other pass-through entity.139  Repeated
attempts have been made to seriously consider an integrated share-
holder-corporation tax system.140  In May 2011, the Treasury Depart-
ment indicated that it was considering a proposal to tax all businesses
with $50 million of revenue or more as C corporations.141  Others have
called for the outright repeal of the corporate income tax entirely for
all nonpublicly traded entities,142 variations of shareholder-corporate
integration,143 or for the tax deductibility of dividends.144  Reform in
this area was endorsed by a recent commission appointed by President
Obama to study the issue of corporate tax reform.145
138. See Martin A. Sullivan, Passthroughs Shrink the Corporate Tax by $140 Billion,
TAX NOTES TODAY, Feb. 28, 2011, available at LEXIS 2011 TNT 39-2.
139. Martin A. Sullivan, Why Not Tax Large Passthroughs as Corporations?, 131 TAX
NOTES 1015 (2011).
140. See AMER. LAW INST., FEDERAL INCOME TAX PROJECT: INTEGRATION OF THE INDI-
VIDUAL AND CORPORATE INCOME TAXES: REPORTER’S STUDY OF CORPORATE TAX IN-
TEGRATION (1993); U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, INTEGRATION OF THE INDIVIDUAL
AND CORPORATE TAX SYSTEMS: TAXING BUSINESS INCOME ONCE (1992), available
at http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/Documents/integration.
pdf.
141. See Ryan J. Donmoyer, Geithner Says Tax Overhaul Must Address Businesses
Filing as Individuals, BLOOMBERG (Feb. 24, 2011, 11:01 PM), http://www.bloom
berg.com/news/2011-02-25/geithner-says-tax-overhaul-must-address-businesses-
filing-as-individuals.html; Sullivan, supra note 125; but see Bradley T. Borden,
Three Cheers for Pass-Through Taxation, TAX NOTES TODAY, June 27th, 2011,
available at LEXIS 2011 TNT 124-5.
142. AM. LAW INST., FEDERAL INCOME TAX PROJECT: TAXATION OF PRIVATE BUSINESS
ENTERPRISES (1999); see also U.S. DEPT. OF THE TREASURY, INTEGRATION OF THE
INDIVIDUAL AND CORPORATE TAX SYSTEMS: TAXING BUSINESS INCOME ONCE (1992),
available at http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/Documents/inte
gration.pdf (advocating in favor of integration); Katherine Pratt, The Debt-Equity
Distinction in a Second-Best World, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1055 (2000).
143. See, e.g., Joseph M. Dodge, A Combined Mark-to-Market and Pass-Through Cor-
porate-Shareholder Integration Proposal, 50 TAX L. REV. 265 (1995).
144. Amir C. Chenchinski & Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, The Case for Dividend Deduction,
(Univ. of Michigan Pub. Law, Working Paper No. 220, 2010), available at http://
ssrn.com/abstract=1680219.
145. PRESIDENT’S ECON. RECOVERY ADVISORY BD., Doc. 2010-19068, THE REPORT ON
TAX REFORM OPTIONS: SIMPLIFICATION, COMPLIANCE, AND CORPORATE TAXATION,
at 74–77 (Aug. 2010).
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The existing entity classification regime violates norms of horizon-
tal equity146 because it creates significant differences in the tax treat-
ment afforded to similar activities depending on the form in which
such business activity is conducted.  The fundamental question is this:
if we are going to have a corporate income tax and if this tax regime is
designed to tax the business activities that occur in this country, then
how does one reconcile this objective with the current scope of the
pass-through entity classification regime that exists under current
law?  If the explosive growth of pass-through entity taxation was in-
tended by Congress, then statements by Congress in the legislative
history to the 1986 Act that purported to defend the “classic view” of
separate corporate-level taxation as the justification for the repeal of
the General Utilities doctrine failed to hit the mark.  Instead of de-
fending the corporate tax base, the 1986 Act has resulted in a signifi-
cant erosion of the corporate tax base except with respect to publicly
traded entities that are unable to escape corporate taxation due to
§ 7704.
Continued inaction on the part of Congress represents a defacto
endorsement of pass-through treatment for nonpublicly traded busi-
nesses since existing law favors the use of pass-through entities and
taxpayers are given the discretion under current law to choose the tax
status for their businesses as long as the businesses are not conducted
in “per se” entities and do not fall within the scope of § 7704.  Seen in
this light, the imposition of a corporate-level tax in the fact pattern set
forth in the Example and Howard represents a piecemeal imposition
of corporate taxation and creates a significantly higher tax cost for
businesses conducted in closely-held C corporations compared with
similarly situated businesses conducted in pass-through entity struc-
tures.  Consequently, at least in the context of closely-held businesses,
it is past time for Congress to rationalize the taxation of nonpublicly
traded business entities regardless of their tax classification.
V. CONCLUSION
It is a great historical irony that the 1986 Act purported to protect
the corporate tax base by repealing the General Utilities doctrine be-
cause in hindsight the 1986 Act was in fact the death knell for a
broad-based corporate income tax.  The 1986 Act provided a relatively
higher corporate tax rate versus individual rates, which allowed tax-
payers a choice in how to conduct their business activities making it
more difficult to distribute appreciated assets out of corporate solution
without incurring corporate-level taxation.  The seeds of the destruc-
146. See Boris I. Bittker, Equity, Efficiency, and Income Tax Theory: Do Misallocations
Drive Out Inequities?, in THE ECONOMICS OF TAXATION 19 (Henry J. Aaron &
Michael J. Boskin eds., 1980).
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tion of the corporate tax base were planted at the very instant Con-
gress was professing to defend it.
One is left with a certain uneasiness about the current state of af-
fairs.  Taxpayers that could elect S corporation status and delay dispo-
sition of built-in gain assets owned by the controlled S corporation for
five, seven, or ten years, depending on the year of disposition, can
avoid any corporate-level taxation on goodwill regardless of its owner-
ship.  New businesses can easily avoid any corporate-level taxation if
the taxpayer elects to treat the business enterprise as a pass-through
entity from the outset.  Given these significant tax concessions for
avoidance of the corporate-level tax, what is the fundamental interest
that Congress continues to desire to protect with respect to corporate
income taxation of closely-held businesses?  At present, at least in the
context of closely-held companies, the tax system seems to create win-
ners and losers that have very little to do with the fundamentals of
business and economic activity.  Congress should reexamine the con-
tours of the corporate income tax regime and decide whether it wants
to defend and broaden the corporate tax base or scrap it entirely for all
nonpublic entities.  The significant disincorporation that has occurred
since the 1986 Act creates a serious challenge to the continued efficacy
of the corporate income tax regime as applied to closely-held busi-
nesses and creates artificial distinctions that violate norms of horizon-
tal equity.
Until a broader policy review is conducted, the courts should, and
likely will, protect the corporate tax base in a manner consistent with
current law.  At first blush, arguments that claim that the Share-
holder in the Example is the tax owner of a capital asset comprised of
the personal goodwill appear solid.  But when the logical conclusions
of the arguments are worked through existing law, the result is that
these claims are simply not supportable based on the facts posited in
the Example.  If the Shareholder claims the intangible asset that ex-
ists in the Example represents residual goodwill that cannot be sepa-
rated into a discrete marketing intangible, then it cannot be separated
from the operating business assets, which in the context of the Exam-
ple, are owned by the controlled C corporation.
However, if the Shareholder claims that there is a shareholder-
owned intangible that is a separate and distinct intangible that can be
transferred, i.e., a marketing intangible exists, then at that instance
§ 482 and its regulations come into play because those provisions ap-
ply any time an intangible can be separated from the legal personality
and transferred between related persons.  The § 482 regulations
would find that the economic benefits of any intangible that might ex-
ist in the Example would be allocated to the C corporation because
the C corporation funded the enhancement in value of the marketing
intangible.  Furthermore, if the Shareholder did not reimburse the C
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corporation in prior periods for the enhancement of value of the Share-
holder’s marketing intangible, then the IRS would also have estoppel
arguments based on the duty of consistency doctrine.
Finally, cases such as MacDonald and Providence Mill Supply Co.
have long provided that personal ability, skill, experience, relation-
ships, or other personal characteristics or accomplishments that are
retained by an individual simply do not constitute goodwill or an item
of transferrable property for tax purposes. Martin Ice Cream simply
does not provide any material support for a contrary position.  Accord-
ingly, current tax planning that attempts to escape corporate-level
taxation in the context of the Example based on the idea of transfer-
rable personal shareholder-level goodwill attempts to build an argu-
ment that unfortunately cannot withstand the sunlight of analysis
under current tax law absent the taxpayer’s demonstration that some
additional legally relevant facts that are not discussed above are im-
plicated in the particular situation.
